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This Article considers the legal, tax and accounting aspects of the
non-statutory Pennsylvania rules of apportionment between income
and principal of trustees' receipts from the sale of or distributions
based upon stock investments.' Since the new statutory apportionment
rules of the Pennsylvania Principal and Income Act 2 apply only to
interests created after 1945,3 non-statutory rules will continue to play
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1. Similar problems of apportionment arise in situations where businesses are held
in trust for the benefit of an income beneficiary, where unproductive real estate is kept
in trust pending "salvage operations" and where stock in wasting asset companies
is held by the trust. These problems, although similar in that they require apportion-
ments, are somewhat different in their bases of treatment and, therefore, are not con-
sidered. Most apportionment problems involve life tenants, but an apportionment can
arise in the similar case of an estate for years or a legal life estate. Distinctions have
been suggested; see, e.g., 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS 1261 (1939), but neither the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, nor the Restatenmwt of Trusts
make any distinction; see R5STAT4MPNT, TausS § 236 (b) (1935); NATIoNAL CoN-
3RZNCZ OT CCommssINI RS ON UNORM STAU LAWS, HANDBoo 328-37 (1931).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470 (Pardon Supp. 1956), substantially reenacted
the Uniform Principal and Income Act, PA. STAT. AmN. tit. 20, § 3471 (Purdon Supp.
1956).
3. Warden Trust, 382 Pa. 311, 115 A.2d 159 (1955); Steele Estate, 377 Pa. 250,
103 A.2d 409 (1954) ; Crawford Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949) ; Pew Trust,
362 Pa. 468, 67 A2d 129 (1949) ; Note, 99 U. PA L. RFv. 864, 865 (1951).
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an energetic part in the law of apportionments in this state. And
although the discussion centers on Pennsylvania decisions the problems,
their analysis, and the mechanics of their solution are common to all
states concerned with apportionments.4
Exploration into this changing area of the law will be divided
into five segments: a survey of basic concepts and policy considerations;
an analysis of qualifying apportionment events; a study and review of
specific problems of the present apportionment situation; a review of
the tax aspects of apportionment distributions; and, finally, an ex-
ploration of changes and nuances in the law of trusts occasioned by
apportionment problems. The terminology used is that of testamentary
trusts, for most of the cases involve decedents estates; but the principles
discussed apply equally to the administration of inter vivos trusts.'
I. BASIC CONCEPTS
Pennsylvania apportionment rules have an Alice-in-Wonderland-
like quality which makes the area a fertile field for litigation.' They
seem designed to prove that the "truth" is what the proponent proposes,
with the result that the truth too often depends upon expedient corpo-
rate accounting practices.
The leading American case requiring an apportionment of trustees'
receipts from stock is Earp's Appeal7 in which the testator had be-
4. For discussion of other jurisdictions which follow or have followed the Penn-
sylvania rule, see Nemmers, Key Problems in the Apportionment of Increase Between
Successive Interests in Personalty, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 815, 827 (1943); 3 Scorr,
TRusT s §§ 236.3, 241A (2d ed. 1956); R1ZSTAT mNT, TRUSTS § 236 (Supp. 1948).
5. Brigham, Allocation of Receipts of Shares Held in Trust, 85 U. PA. L. R~v.
358, 360 (1937).
6. By 1937 there had been 50 apportionment cases decided by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court alone. Faught, Statutory Solution of the Problem of Allocation Be-
tween Life Tenant and Rentainderman, 11 Txm'. L.Q. 139, 141 (1937).
7. 28 Pa. 368 (1857). This is the origin of the Pennsylvania rule of apportion-
ments. Insofar as it concerns corporate distributions, the rule has had a wide accept-
ance and prior to 1935 was followed in a majority of jurisdictions and in the 1935
version of the Restatement of Trusts. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 236 (1935); RESTATE-
mnNT, TRusTs § 236 (Supp. 1948). In recent years, however, the trend has been toward
the contrary Massachusetts rule in which the form of the distribution mad not its
source controls. This reversal has been due partially to judicial decisions and partly
to the enactment by eighteen states of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, 9A
UNivoRm LAwS ANN. 80 (Supp. 1956), which follows the Massachusetts rule. This
trend is manifested by the 1947 amendment to the Restatement of Trusts, which sub-
stitutes the Massachusetts rule for the Pennsylvania rule. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS 940-
42 (Supp. 1948) ; 3 Scowr, TRuSTS 1816 (2d ed. 1956). Insofar as proceeds from the
trustee's sale of stock are concerned, the rule has been accepted only in Pennsylvania.
3 ScoTT, TRUSTS 1837-38 (2d ed. 1956); cf. RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 233, comment
b (1935). Moreover, no courts have followed the principle of Earp's Appeal to what
Professor Scott calls "its ultimate. logical conclusion [and] treat the earnings of the
corporation as for all purposes as income to the shareholders." 3 ScoTT, TRUSTs 1818
(2d ed. 1956). The Pennsylvania rule has been supported for its fairness, but criticized
for its unwieldiness, while the Massachusetts rule most often is justified because of its
simplicity. 3 Scoi-r, TRUSTS 1817-19 (2d ed. 1956). See How~s, THE AmERiCAN LAW
RLATING To INCOME AND PRINCIPAL (1905) for an early discussion of the various
rules.
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queathed shares of stock in trust for life with power of appointment in
the life tenant. At testator's death, the corporation had a capital of
$200,000 and surplus of approximately $300,000; thereafter in 1854,
when surplus had increased to $714,000, the corporation declared a 150
per cent stock dividend which increased capital to $500,000. The
auditor awarded the entire stock dividend to the life tenant, but the
orphans' court held that "there [should] be taken as part of the
principal and residue of the estate, to be held in trust, so many of the
shares issued at the increase of the capital . . . in 1854, as shall be
equal to the value of the five hundred and forty shares of the stock
held by the trustees at the testator's death." 8 The decree was affirmed
unanimously by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the theory that
the life tenant's interest commenced only at the death of the testator
and, therefore, he had no right to earnings accumulated prior thereto.
On the other hand, earnings thereafter were "'income' within the
meaning of the will," ' not merely because the earnings accumulated
during the trust period but, more importantly, because that was con-
strued to be the testator's intention.Y0
Apportionment is thus intended to preserve the initial trust corpus,
called intact value, and yet give to the life tenant the equivalent of
earnings retained by a corporation during the period of the trust's
ownership of the stock." Before a distribution can be made to the life
tenant, however, there must first occur an apportionable event. The
key concepts, therefore, are "intact value," "earnings," and "appor-
tionable event."
In applying these concepts, certain judicial predispositions exist.
The testator's intent controls where clear,' 2 if it does not direct an un-
8. 28 Pa. at 372.
9. Id. at 374.
10. The limitation to earnings retained during the trust period conflicted, in a
sense, with the common-law rule that dividends are earned only when declared. This
rule had formed the basis of the life tenant's case, since the dividend was declared and
presumably earned only after the death of the testator. However, the court rejected
this concept as being based on convenience and subject to variation where the purposes
of justice so required.
11. See, e.g., Steele Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 253, 103 A.2d 409, 411 (1954); Water-
house's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 427-28, 162 Atl. 295, 296 (1932) ; Nirdlinger's Estate, 290
Pa. 457, 463, 464, 470, 139 Atl. 200, 202, 203, 205 (1927) ; Stokes' Estate (No. 1), 240
Pa. 277, 284-87, 87 Atl. 971, 974-75 (1913) ; Frick Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 247, 257
(Orphans' Ct. 1955); Fownes Trust, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d, 637, 644 (Orphans' Ct. 1955) ;
Damrau, Apportionment of Stock Dividends in Trusts Created Prior to 1945, 15 U.
PiTT. L. Rzv. 34, 43 (1953).
12. Crozer's Estate, 336 Pa. 266, 270, 9 A.2d 535, 537 (1939); Knox's Estate
(No. 1), 328 Pa. 177, 182, 195 Atl. 28, 31 (1937) ; Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa. 144, 153, 73
Atl. 320, 323 (1909); Robinson's Trust, 218 Pa. 481, 486, 67 Atl. 775, 777 (1907);
Jordan Estate, 83 Pa. D. & C. 1, 10 (Orphans' Ct. 1952). See also RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 236, comment b (1935) ; Annots., 130 A.L.R. 492, 509 (1941), 44 A.L.R.2d
1277, 1281 (1955) ; Faught, supra note 6, at 150-52.
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lawful disposition."3  But where this intention is not expressed with
sufficient specificity " or is considered unclear,' courts utilize certain
presumptions to define the intent '" which they will apply unless it is
affirmatively shown that a contrary intention was expressed.17  More-
over, life tenants are favored,'" especially where they are the "primary
concern of the testator's bounty," 19 i.e., wives and children.20
A. Intact Value 
21
Intact value represents that value assigned to the initial corpus
or subsequently purchased stock which must be preserved prior to any
distribution to the life tenant. This illusive term has seen much varia-
13. E.g., problem of accumulations in violation of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3251
(Purdon 1930) (repealed, id. tit. 20, § 3251 (Purdon Supp. 1956)). See, e.g., Warden
Trust, 382 Pa. 311, 315, 115 A.2d 159, 161 (1955) ; Maris's Estate, 301 Pa. 20, 23, 151
Atl. 577, 578 (1930) ; Quay's Estate, 253 Pa. 80, 82, 97 AtI. 1029, 1030 (1916) ; See
also 3 Scom, TRusTs §§ 235A, 236.15 (2d ed. 1956).
14. ". . . in every case the intention of the settlor of the trust, so far as it can
be ascertained, must control. 'The intent of the grantor, or testator, is the pole-star,
and will be carried out by the court' . . . ." Robinson's Trust, 218 Pa. 481, 486, 67
Atl. 775, 777 (1907) ; see also Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 156, 140 AtI.
862, 864 (1928) ; Flaccus's Estate, 283 Pa. 185, 129 Atl. 74 (1925) ; Yates Estate, 281
Pa. 178, 185, 126 Atl. 254, 256 (1924) ; Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa. 144, 153, 73 Atl. 320,
323 (1909) ; Spring's Estate, 216 Pa. 529, 533, 66 At. 110, 111 (1907) ; Annots., 130
A.L.R. 492, 509 (1941) and cases cited therein, 44 A.L.R.2d 1277, 1281 (1955) where
it is said to be "well settled that the expressed intention of the trust settlor or testator
will be given controlling effect in determining whether dividends or other corporate
distributions should be regarded as income or principal for purposes of allocaton in
a trust estate." Cf. Opperman's Estate (No. 1), 319 Pa. 455, 459, 179 Adt. 729, 732
(1935) Crozer's Estate, 336 Pa. 266, 9 A.2d 535 (1939), where the court stated, "In
apportionment cases, under our settled rules, the rights of the parties must be deter-
mined in the light of the intent of the creator of the trust when it is possible to ascer-
tain his purpose from the instrument creating the trust and the surrounding circum-
stances." Id. at 270, 9 A.2d at 537; 3 ScOT, TRUSTS § 236.15 (2d ed. 1956) ; REsTArE-
mzNT, TRusTs § 236, comment b (1935).
15. See 3 Scow, TRUSTS 1819, 1846-48 (2d ed. 1956) ; Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1277,
1298 (1955).
16. Jordan's Estate, 83 Pa. D. & C. 1 (Orphans' Ct. 1952) and cases cited therein.
17. Waterman's Estate, 279 Pa. 491, 124 AtI. 166 (1924). In the great majority
of instances, however, the testator or settlor uses general language and the judical
rules of construction are applied. See Annot., 130 A.L.R. 492, 512 (1941).
18. Nirdlinger's Estate, 331 Pa. 135, 138, 200 Adt. 656, 657 (1938); Nirdlinger's
Estate (No. 2), 327 Pa. 171, 173-74, 193 Atl. 30, 31-32 (1937) ; Neafie's Estate, 325
Pa. 561, 570, 191 At. 56, 60-61 (1937) ; Park's Estate, 173 Pa. 190, 195, 33 AtI. 884,
885 (1896). See also 3 Scow , TRuSTS 1820 (2d ed. 1956) ; Trachtman, Use of Prin-
cipal for Life Beneficiaries, 83 TRuSTS & EsTATs 444 (1946) ; Apportionment-Stock
-Income Beneficiaries Favored, Fiduciary Review, Jan. 1944, p. 3.
19. Steele Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 253, 103 A.2d 409, 411 (1954).
20. Crozer's Estate, 336 Pa. 266, 270, 9 A.2d 535, 537 (1939) ; Opperman's Estate
(No. 1), 319 Pa. 455, 459, 179 AtI. 729, 732 (1935) ; Geyelin's Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C.
296, 304 (Orphans' Ct. 1937).
21. See generally Brigham, supra note 5, at 361; Damrau, supra note 11, at 43;
Annot., 130 A.L.R. 492, 543 (1941).
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tion in definition. It has been described as market,22 appraised, 3
inventoried,24 actual,- real and intrinsic value2  However, recent
cases involving decedent-owned stock are consistent in holding that
intact value is the adjusted book value at the testator's death,27 unless
it can be shown that the factors comprising book value are not true
values. And Arrott's Estate29 lately resolved a hitherto vague
issue" ° by holding that the intact value of trustee-purchased stock is
cost. 1
The inconsistency of using cost to determine intact value for
trustee-purchased shares, but book value for decedent-owned shares, is
22. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368, 371 (1857); Philadelphia Trust, Safe-Deposit &
Ins. Co.'s Appeal, 16 AtI. 734 (Pa. 1889).
23. Quay's Estate, 253 Pa. 80, 83, 97 Atl. 1029, 1030 (1916).
24. "To preserve the shares at the inventoried price ... " Mandeville's Estate,
286 Pa. 368, 372, 133 Atl. 562, 563 (1926).
25. "The market value may aid in the ascertainment of the actual value ......
Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa. 144, 152, 73 Atl. 320, 323 (1909) ; Moss' Appeal, 83 Pa. 264,
271 (1877).
26. Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 455, 132 Atl. 352, 354 (1926); "It is the
intrinsic value . . . which governs .... " Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 357, 21 Atl.
438, 440 (1891).
27. Flinn's Estate, 310 Pa. 206 211 165 AUt. 31, 33 (1932); Waterhouse's Es-
tate, 308 Pa. 422, 427, 162 Atl. 295, 296' (1932) ; Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. 39, 42, 148
Atl. 907, 908 (1930); Mallory's Estate, 285 Pa. 186, 191-92, 131 AUt. 714, 715-16
(1926); Fox's Trust Estate, 53 Pa. D. & C. 1, 6 (Orphans' Ct. 1945). For purposes
of this Article the term "book value" refers to adjusted book value unless otherwise
indicated.
28. King Estate, 355 Pa. 64, 68, 48 A.2d 858, 861 (1946). But the use of market
value as intact value of decedent-owned stock has some foundation in logic. Thus the
rule is expressed in some cases that where a gift is in general terms, comprising no
specific items of property, there is an implied conversion into cash which establishes
an intact value indicative of cash (i.e., market) value. Park's Estate, 173 Pa. 190,
193, 33 Atl. 884 (1896); Jordan Estate, 83 Pa. D. & C. 1, 13 (Orphans' Ct. 1952).
This rationale is espicially persuasive if one considers that, when a testamentary trust
is established sometime after death and completion of the executorship, the intact
value may be determined as of the time the trust is created. Frick Estate, 4 Pa. D. &
C.2d 247 (Orphans' Ct. 1955). Further, if the executor has converted the testator's
assets into cash following the testator's death, and that cash had then been used to
fund the trust, the intact value would be the conversion (market) value and not book
value. It might also be significant that the trustee is surcharged on the basis of
market value.
Perhaps the market value rule has not been accepted because intact value rules
were evolved prior to and during the 1930 depression era when book value usually
exceeded market value, and use of the higher book value tended to protect the trust
corpus. Nevertheless, it is arguable that market value should be intact value, particu-
larly if there is an expressed direction to convert assets into cash prior to creation of
the trust. Cf. Jordan Estate, supra.
29. 383 Pa. 228, 118 A.2d 187 (1955) ; see also Principal and Itwome-Stock Divi-
dends-Cost as Intact Value, Fiduciary Review, Dec. 1955, p. 1.
30. See, e.g., Fownes Trust, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 637 (Orphans' Ct. 1955); Hos-
tetter's Trust, 319 Pa. 572, 181 Atl. 567 (1935); Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422
(1932) ; Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 140 Atl. 862 (1928).
31. Arrott's Estate contained a stipulation that cost exceeded the book value of
all of the stocks in question, but the record indicates that some stock was acquired
at a cost less than book value, and in those instances the parties disregarded book
value and accepted the lower cost as intact value.
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rationalized by explaining that cost must be used for the former lest
the life tenant receive as income a portion of the corpus (the excess
of cost over book value at date of purchase). But this reasoning
would seem to apply equally to decedent-owned shares (substituting
market value for cost), especially if the executor may convert them
and reinvest the proceeds.
Arrott's Estate did not consider the situation in which a trustee
exercises stock rights. This problem is an enigma because under the
decisions the life tenant receives preferential treatment upon the
exercise of rights,"2 even when this requires cash payments from corpus,
but does not receive such treatment when the rights are sold. Never-
theless, in clarifying the related problem of stock dividends Arrott's
Estate may have a tendency to influence other situations.3s
Moreover, while the question of apportionment of the proceeds
from the sale of trustee-purchased stock was not considered, it would
seem that the same intact value rule would apply, as was hinted in
Hostetter's Trust3 4 and Jones v. Integrity Trust Co. 5  Indeed, the
lower courts have twice reached this conclusion.
3 6
The intact value to be preserved includes all value increments such
as share purchases by the corporation, contributed surplus,3 7 or other
increments of a purely capital nature. It may be increased by agree-
ment of the parties,"8 and it must be decreased to reflect capital losses
which traditionally are not regarded as part of the life tenant's income
share3 9 But no adjustment would be required upon the issuance of
new stock at less than book value."
32. Hostetter's Trust, 319 Pa. 572, 181 At. 567 (1935).
33. E.g., it may have some bearing on the valuation problem raised in Hostetter's
Trust, supra note 32.
34. Ibid.
35. 292 Pa. 149, 140 Atl. 862 (1928). See also Steele Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 254, 103
A.2d 409, 411 (1954) ; King Estate, 361 Pa. 629, 635, 66 A.2d 68, 71 (1949) ; Water-
house's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 428, 162 Atl. 295, 296 (1932); Baird's Estate, 299 Pa.
39, 42, 148 Atl. 907, 908 (1930); Packer's Estate (No. 1), 291 Pa. 194, 197, 139
Atl. 867, 868 (1927). But see Stokes' Estate (No. 2), 240 Pa. 288, 291, 87 Atl. 975,
976 (1913); Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa. 144, 152, 73 Atl. 320, 323 (1909); Smith's Es-
tate, 140 Pa. 344, 357, 21 Atl. 438, 440 (1891) where the court said that market value
may be of help in determining intact value; Philadelphia Trust, Safe-Deposit & Ins.
Co.'s Appeal, 16 Atl. 734 (Pa. 1889); Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857) where the
court talked of market value as the basis of intact value. It should be noted, however,
that these latter cases are not followed in later decisions.
36. Wilford's Estate, 72 Montg. Co. L.R. 535 (Pa. 1956); Robert's Estate, Civil
No. 317, Orphans' Ct., Phila. Co., 1932.
37. Dobson's Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C. 154 (Orphans' Ct. 1936).
38. Bullitt's Estate, 308 Pa. 413, 419, 162 At. 288, 290-91 (1932).
39. Lueders' Estate, 337 Pa. 155, 159, 10 A.2d 415, 417 (1940); Dickinson's Es-
tate, 285 Pa. 449, 453, 132 Atl. 352, 353 (1926).
40. Willcox's Estate, 66 Pa. Super. 182 (1917).
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B. Earnings 41
The life tenant is entitled to receive only income that the corpora-
tion earns as a business function.4 He is not entitled to receive
monies accruing to the corporation from the sale of capital assets,"
nor the benefits of purely speculative values of the stock,' nor that
value mirroring potential earning capacity, 8 nor good will,4" nor the
increased value of capital assets, 7 for such increases are not "earnings."
Normally, a portion of distributable earnings of a corporation is re-
tained in the earned surplus account, and from there may be shifted
into reserve accounts or elsewhere.48 It is immaterial in what form
such accumulations may from time to time appear; 4 they will never-
theless be a source for apportionment.
In calculating the apportionment, there is a presumption that a
corporation acts in good faith in its bookkeeping and the use of its
surplus account,"0 and ordinarily the court will accept corporate book-
keeping where good faith is shown. 1 However, the valuation of assets
carried at nominal value is a proper subject for proof, 2 and in certain
instances accounting practices must give way to actualities." Where
a corporation creates an excessive depreciation reserve out of earnings,
this will not preclude the right of the life tenant to recapture those
41. See generally Brigham, supra note 5, at 366; Note, 13 TtmP. L.Q. 237 (1939);
Note, 33 VA. L. Rzv. 749 (1947); PASTATXMXNT, TRUSTS §§ 236 (e), (f) (193),
which refers to a return on capital; Annots., 130 A.L.R. 492, 575 (1941), 44 A.L.R.2d
1277, 1304 (1955) ; 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 236.11, 236.14 (2d ed. 1956).
42. It should be noted that this "business function" does not have to be the pri-
mary one of the corporation. Profits derived from "miscellaneous sources" may be
included in "earnings." Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 428, 162 Atl. 295, 296
(1932); Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. 441, 448, 154 Atl. 814, 816 (1931); Dobson's
Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C. 154 (Orphans' Ct. 1936).
43. Graham's Estate, 198 Pa. 216, 47 Atl. 1108 (1901); Vinton's Appeal, 99
Pa. 434 (1882). Although no cases can be cited, it has been suggested that if assets
were originally acquired from earnings, this would be an exception. Brigham,
supra note 5, at 367. Also, if a corporation deals in real estate, profits from its sale
may be earnings. Mandeville's Estate, 286 Pa. 368, 133 Atl. 562 (1926); Thomson's
Estate, 153 Pa. 332, 26 Atl. 653 (1893); Oliver's Estate. 136 Pa. 43, 20 Atl. 527
(1890).
44. Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 455, 132 Ad. 352, 353-54 (1926); Fox's
Trust, 53 Pa. D. & C. 1, 7 (Orphans' Ct. 1945).
45. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 429, 162 At. 295, 296 (1932).
46. Ibid. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 478-79, 139 AU. 200, 208 (1927).
47. Ibid.
48. Cf. Cassatt's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 14, 158 Atl. 586 (1931).
49. Ibid.
50. Neafie's Estate, 325 Pa. 561, 568, 191 At. 56, 59 (1937).
51. King Estate, 355 Pa. 64, 68, 48 A.2d 858, 861 (1946).
52. Neafie's Estate, 325 Pa. 561, 191 Atl. 56 (1937) ; Flinn's Estate, 320 Pa. 15,
181 At. 492 (1935) ; Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. 39, 148 Atl. 907 (1930).
53. Pardee's Estate, 343 Pa. 79, 21 A.2d 904 (1941) ; Flinn's Estate, 320 Pa. 15,
181 Atl. 492 (1935) ; Baird's Estate. 299 Pa. 39, 148 At. 907 (1930) ; Dobson's Es-
tate, 26 Pa. D. & C. 154 (Orphans' Ct. 1936).
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earnings upon an apportionable event; " but if a dividend is paid out
of a proper depreciation reserve, it belongs in corpus.' However,
where a dividend of new par value stock is bottomed upon the capitaliza-
tion of a surplus other than earned, there can be no apportionment."6
The capitalization of surplus attributable to a stock dividend is often
an elusive problem, and the existence, nature, and amount of the
apportionable item is all too frequently contingent upon the character
of the surplus which is capitalized in order to support the newly issued
stock.5 7
The delineation of book value, as a division point in segregating
earnings, is not a mere mechanical exercise."8 In brief, but subject to
adjustments to reflect proper corporate accounting, it consists of
contributed capital plus accumulated earnings as of the date of compu-
tation, and it can be considered as capital plus earned surplus divided
by the outstanding shares. 9
A capital gain or loss ordinarily requires an adjustment only to
intact value and will not affect the amount of accumulated earnings.60
However, operation losses, although unusually large, are charged
against earnings and therefore reduce the life tenant's share.61
54. McCahan's Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 171 (Orphans' Ct 1933), rev'd on other
grounds, 312 Pa. 515, 168 AUt. 685 (1933). There is a presumption that the most
recently retained earnings are those first paid out by the corporation upon an appor-
tionable event.
55. Woolston's Estate, 36 Pa. D. & C. 574 (Orphans' Ct. 1939), involved a dis-
tribution from a depletion reserve.
56. Opperman's Estate (No. 1), 319 Pa. 455, 179 Atl. 729 (1935); Chauncey's
Estate, 303 Pa. 441, 154 Atl. 814 (1931) ; Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 Ad. 352
(1926); Fowne's Trust, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 637 (Orphans' Ct. 1955).
57. The General Electric Company 3-for-i stock split of May 17, 1954, is an
excellent example. The company retired each share of no par stock having -a stated
value of $6.25 per share, and issued in exchange three shares of $5.00 par value stock.
The difference between $6.25 and $15.00, or $8.75, was charged against earned sur-
plus. This transaction is not a usual stock dividend in that a different type stock was
used to capitalize earnings. In this situation there is not only the element of a stock
dividend (up to $8.75 per old share) but also a sale or exchange to a sufficient degree
to be treated as partially apportionable after reservation of intact value. The appor-
tionable amount should be restricted to the amount of earned surplus capitalized. See
Cunningham's Estate, Civil No. 187 (1934), Orphans' Ct., Phila. Co., Nov. 1956;
cf. In re Fosdick's Trust, 147 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1955) ; In re Muller's Estate,
145 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Surr. 1955). See note 75a infra.
58. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 162 AU. 295 (1932) ; Nirdlinger's Estate, 290
Pa. 457, 139 Ati. 200 (1927).
59. Mallory's Estate, 285 Pa. 186, 191, 131 At. 714, 715-16 (1926).
60. Lueders' Estate, 337 Pa. 155, 10 A.2d 415 (1940); Waterhouse's Estate, 308
Pa. 422, 162 Atl. 295 (1932) ; Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 At. 200 (1927).
61. Lueders' Estate, supra note 60; Neafie's Estate, 325 Pa. 561, 191 At. 56
(1937). Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 At. 352 (1926), presents a strange
anomaly in its holding that the balance of an extraordinary underwriting loss of a fire
insurance company, after first being applied in reduction of earnings, should be charged
against intact value; i.e., as pointed out in the dissenting opinion, the loss was im-
properly regarded as part capital and part operating in character. Id. at 457, 132
Atl. at 358.
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Once it is established that the transaction constitutes an appor-
tionable event, it becomes "wholly immaterial in what form such
accumulations appear." I The courts are not bound by the corpora-
tion's accounting methods, whether they concern day-by-day handling
of the income and capital accounts or whether they involve adjustments
in the company's asset values, as in a reorganization.'
C. Apportionable Events
The mere existence of profits in a corporation does not warrant
an apportionment. 4 In addition, there must be an apportionable
event. An apportionable event may be precipitated by an act of the
corporation or the trustee. Examples are a stock dividend,"0 a dis-
tribution in liquidation, 7 the sale of stock,' the sale 0 or exercise of
rights to subscribe,7 distribution of cash or scrip dividends, 71 dis-
tribution of dividends paid in the stock of another company,72 and, in
some instances, a distribution pursuant to a corporate reorganization. 73
In Buist's Estate"4 the court categorized the apportionment area as
follows: distribution of a cash dividend or of a stock dividend,
liquidation of a corporation, or the sale of stock by the trustees. It
is not clear whether these areas were defined as examples or limitations,
although it seems preferable to consider them as the former. In any
case, Pennsylvania courts are apparently not bound by the form of the
corporate transaction if its effect is that of a transaction giving rise to
apportionment.5 Although there appear to be no Pennsylvania cases
62. King Estate, 349 Pa. 27, 29, 36 A.2d 504, 506 (1944).
63. Pardee's Estate, 343 Pa. 79, 85, 21 A.2d 904, 906 (1941); Daily's Estate, 323
Pa. 42, 47, 186 Atl. 754, 756 (1936) ; Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 471, 139 At.
200, 205-06 (1927) ; McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, 84, 106 Atl. 189, 190-91 (1919).
64. King Estate, 355 Pa. 64, 68, 48 A.2d 858, 861 (1946).
65. Buises Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 543, 147 Atl. 606, 608 (1929).
66. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
67. Connolly's Estate (No. 1), 198 Pa. 137, 47 At. 1125 (1901); McKeown's
Estate, 263 Pa. 78, 106 At. 189 (1919).
68. McKeown's Estate, supra note 67; Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 At.
200 (1927).
69. See Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 429-30, 162 Atl. 295, 296-97 (1932).
70. Hostetter's Trust, 319 Pa. 572, 181 Ati. 567 (1935). See also Jones v. Integ-
rity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 140 At. 862 (1928).
71. Nirdlinger's Estate (No. 1), 327 Pa. 160, 193 Atl. 33 (1937); Mandeville's
Estate, 286 Pa. 368, 133 Atl. 562 (1926) ; Flaccus' Estate, 283 Pa. 185, 194, 129 At.
74, 77 (1925). See also Opperman's Estate (No. 1), 319 Pa. 455, 179 At. 729 (1935).
72. Barnes' Estate, 338 Pa. 555, 12 A.2d 912 (1940).
73. Daily's Estate, 323 Pa. 42, 186 At. 754 (1936).
74. 297 Pa. 537, 147 Atl. 606 (1929) ; cf. RnzsA riMNT, TRusrs § 236 (e), com-
ment y (1935).
75. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 470, 139 AtI. 200, 205 (1927).
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on the point, it would seem that a pure stock split is not an apportionable
event; but where a stock split is supported by a capitalization of earned
surplus, this should constitute an apportionable event to the extent of
the amount capitalized.7a
1. Extraordinary Dividends 7
Under the English rule the life tenant received ordinary dividends,
while extraordinary dividends were awarded to principal.77  More-
over, designation by the distributing corporation was conclusive and,
unless the distribution was labeled an "extraordinary dividend" or
"bonus," it was treated as an ordinary dividend regardless of the
form or amount of the payment."m
This arbitrary distinction is incorporated into the Pennsylvania
rules in the sense that those payments which are "ordinary dividends"
go to the life tenant notwithstanding that the intact value of the corpus
may be impaired, while those which are "extraordinary dividends"
are apportionable. Ordinary and extraordinary dividends are dis-
tinguished by considering regularity in amount and consistency in
time interval. Ordinary dividends have been defined as "periodical
payments becoming due at fixed intervals"; " as dividends "regularly
declared at uniform intervals and rates theretofore or customarily
used" ;8" or as "usual or customary dividend[s] at a fixed per cent or
sum per share, paid at regular periods." 81 The Restatement of Trusts
regards as important "the designation, if any, [used] by the Directors
of the corporation." 82 On the other hand, extraordinary dividends are
those which are so
75a. See Soles v. Granger, 174 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1949); Matter of Sanford,
4 Misc. 2d 487, 161 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Surr. 1957) ; In re Davis Estate, 128 N.Y.S.2d 152
(Surr. 1953). See also note 57 supra.
76. See RS'rATZmS N', TRusTs § 236(b), comments r-v (1935) ; 3 ScoTT, TRusTs
§§ 236.3-236.5 (2d ed. 1956); Brigham, supra note 5; Brigham, Some Problems of
Principal and Income, 56 DICK. L. REv. 377 (1952); Damrau, supra note 11; Faught,
supra note 6, at 154, 155; Ives, Allocating Stock Dividends, 91 TRuSTS & ESTATES 851
(1952); Nemmers, Key Problems in the Apportionment of Increase Between Succes-
sive Interests in Personalty, 41 MICH. L. Rzv. 815, 831 (1943) ; Notes, 86 U. PA. L.
REv. 765, 767 (1938) ; 12 OHIO Sr. L.J. 588 (1951) ; Comment, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 454
(1954) ; Notes, 33 VA. L. REv. 749 (1947) ; 1942 Wis. L. REv. 299; 39 MINN. L. R v.
338 (1955); 12 TZMP. L.Q. 266 (1938); 22 TENN. L. REv. 973 (1953); 5 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 288 (1948); Annots., 44 A.L.R.2d 1277 (1955), 50 A.L.R. 375 (1927), 42
A.L.R. 448, 449-58 (1926), 24 A.L.R. 9, 14-92 (1923).
77. Note, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 765, 767 & n.15 (1938); Annots., 130 A.L.R. 492,
518 (1941) ; 16 L.R.A. 461 (1892) ; 45 L.R.A. 392 (1899).
78. Note, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 765, 767 & n.16 (1938).
79. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368, 374 (1857).
80. Opperman's Estate (No. 1), 319 Pa. 455, 461, 179 Atl. 729, 734 (1935).
81. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 462, 139 Atl. 200, 202 (1927).
82. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §236(a), comment c(5) (1935). Other factors are:
Whether similar dividends have been declared regularly in the past; whether such
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"unusual in amount or form as to require an investigation into
their source and apportionment according to equitable principles
rather than an application of the common law rule that a dividend
belongs to the party entitled to it at the date of its declaration.
In other words, the unusual character of the dividend requires
form and convenience to give way to substance and equity." s3
Fortunately, the rules for apportionment of extraordinary dividends
are now relatively clear and provide an example of operation of the
Pennsylvania apportionment law under optimum conditions. An
extraordinary dividend presumptively belongs to the life tenant, 4
but will be retained in corpus to the extent that remaindermen show
that intact value of the trust investment would otherwise be impaired
or that a portion of the value of the dividend is due to capital apprecia-
tion rather than retained earnings These principles apply regardless
of the form of the extraordinary dividend. It may take the form of a
cash or scrip dividend, 8 as well as the more common case of a stock
dividend. Thus, a dividend paid in cash plus stock rights was held
apportionable,17 as was one paid in scrip"8 and one paid in the stock
of another company.89 Moreover, such payments may require appor-
tionment not only between principal and income but also between past
and present life tenants. Application of these rules will not be controlled
by federal decisions in income tax litigation,9" for the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has said that "the sole question is whether there is an
impairment of the intrinsic value of the shares held in the trust; the
rule is not concerned with the identity of the property constituting that
value." 91
dividends are regularly paid out of current earnings; the size of the dividend in rela-
tion to the market value and the par value at the date of the creation of the shares;
and the source of the earnings from which the distribution is made.
83. Nirdlinger's Estate (No. 1), 327 Pa. 160, 168, 193 Atl. 33, 37 (1937).
84. Hostetter's Trust, 319 Pa. 572, 574, 181 At. 567, 568 (1935); Waterhouse's
Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 428, 162 Atl. 295, 296 (1932) ; Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. 441,
446, 154 Atl. 814, 815 (1931) ; Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. 436, 146 Atl. 111 (1929) ;
Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 468, 139 Atl. 200, 204 (1927) ; McKeown's Estate, 263
Pa. 78, 86, 106 Atl. 189, 191-92 (1919) ; Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa. 144, 152, 73 Atl. 320,
323 (1909); French's Estate, 84 Pa. D. & C. 525, 528 (Orphans' Ct. 1952).
85. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 429, 162 Atl. 295, 296 (1932). The remain-
derman bears the burden of proving not only that intact value is jeopardized, but also
that the source of the dividend is capital increment rather than earnings.
86. Nirdlinger's Estate (No. 1), 327 Pa. 160, 168, 193 Atl. 33, 37 (1937).
87. In Thompson's Estate, 262 Pa. 278, 105 Atl. 273 (1918), the corporation was
prohibited from declaring a stock dividend and instead, issued stock subscription
rights plus a cash dividend which was used to exercise those rights.
88. Philadelphia Trust, Safe Deposit & Ins. Co.'s Appeal, 1 Mont. Co. L. Rep. 23,
16 Atl. 734 (Pa. 1889).
89. Barnes' Estate, 338 Pa. 555, 12 A.2d 912 (1940).
90. Harkness' Estate, 283 Pa. 464, 129 AtI. 458 (1925).
91. Barnes' Estate, 338 Pa. 555, 559, 12 A.2d 912, 914 (1940).
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The apportionment rules apply even though the remainderman is
entitled to a specific number of shares. In Flaccus's Estate,2 the
decedent bequeathed a specific number of shares to specific legatees
following termination of an income interest. During the income tenure
a 200 per cent stock dividend was distributed. The specific legatee was
held to be entitled only to the intact value of the original shares, al-
though measured in part by the new shares; he was not entitled auto-
matically to three shares where before he would have had but one.
These rules are merely bases for construing the intent of a testator
who has not dealt specifically with the apportionment problem. It
follows that a testator may direct an apportionment, not otherwise
invalid, that varies from the rules. 3 But once their relevance is deter-
mined, the rules are substantive and apply irrespective of action or
inaction on the part of the life tenant. Thus, a life tenant does not lose
his right to an apportionable dividend merely because the new shares
were not transferred to his name during his lifetime; " and the fact
that a dividend was declared after the life tenant's death does not
necessarily deprive his heirs of the apportionment. 5
2. Sale of Stock9 6
As previously stated, the philosophy of the Pennsylvania rule is
to give to the life tenant that portion of the proceeds of the trustee's
sale of stock representing corporate earnings retained during his
tenancy. Consequently, the courts will make an apportionment to the
life tenant where intact value is not impaired if there is a proper showing
that the apportioned amount is attributable to retained earnings."
This rule was clearly expressed in Waterhouse's Estate 98 which said
that
. . where stock that produces income owned by the estate
is sold for a price greater than the intact value . . . and such
greater price is due to an accumulation of income, the proceeds
are apportionable; that is, so much of the proceeds as [is] neces-
sary to preserve the intact value [as defined] goes to the trustees
for the corpus, and only so much of the balance that represents
income goes to the life tenant.
92. 283 Pa. 185, 129 Atl. 74 (1925).
93. Robinson's Trust, 218 Pa. 481, 67 Att. 775 (1907).
94. Mallory's Estate, 285 Pa. 186, 131 Atl. 714 (1926).
95. Simpson's Estate, 23 Pa. Dist. 27 (1914), and see discussion infra at pp. 178-
79, 181.
96. See generally Brigham supra note 5, at 378; Nemmers, supra note 76, at 844;
Faught, supra note 6, at 159; Notes, 61 HAuv. L. Rzv. 721 (1948), 60 HA v. L. Rtv.
1361 (1947), 52 H~Av. L. Riv. 1369 (1939), 27 N.Y.U.L. RzV. 488 (1952); cf. Note,
1942 Wis. L. Rv. 299, 301-03.
97. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 467-77, 139 At!. 200, 204-07 (1927).
98. 308 Pa. 422, 429, 162 At!. 295, 296 (1932).
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"But where the greater value is due to the stock's earning
power, good will, or its intrinsic, speculative, or enhanced market
value, all the proceeds are part of the corpus and belong to the
remainderman; the increase is capital gain."
The courts have been consistent in their interpretation of the
foregoing rules, and have held that a gain reflecting unrealized apprecia-
tion in corporate assets,9 or a rise in the value of bonds,' should be
awarded to principal.' On the other hand, where the gain is partially
from earnings and partially from capital enhancement, courts have given
the amount attributable to earnings to the life tenant.' However, it
is presumed that proceeds from the sale of stock belong to the corpus
of the trust, and the life tenant must therefore sustain the burden of
proof that he is entitled to share.' 3
If, as a matter of corporate accounting, there are accumulated
earnings which adequately support an apportionment of the sales
proceeds, the apportionment will be made even though the corporation
could not distribute those earnings, as where Interstate Commerce
Commission regulations require that such earnings be retained in the
company in an "appropriated surplus" account."0 4
The courts give considerable deference to, and rely heavily upon,
the exact words of "intention" used by the testator. Thus, in Park's
Estate 5 and Quay's Estate 06 the court gave the realized profits from
the trustee's sale of securities to the life tenant because the testator
stated that the life tenant was to receive the "income and profits" of
the trust; whereas, in Graham's Estate,10 7 the court awarded similar
profits from the sale of trust bonds and real estate to corpus,
distinguishing Park's Estate on the ground that the will spoke of dis-
tributing only the "income" to the life tenant.
3. Distribution in Liquidation 108
A true liquidation is similar to a sale of stock in that the trustee
thereby severs his connection with the corporation and its operating
99. Fox's Trust Estate, 53 Pa. D. & C. 1 (Orphans' Ct. 1945).
100. Graham's Estate, 198 Pa. 216, 47 Atl. 1108 (1901); Hubley's Estate, 16
Phila. 327 (1884).
101. Packer's Estate (No. 1), 291 Pa. 194, 139 Atl. 867 (1927).
102. Ibid.
103. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 429, 162 AtI. 295, 296 (1932); Nird-
linger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 468, 139 Atl. 200, 204 (1927).
104. Cassatt's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 14, 17, 158 Atl. 586, 587 (1931).
105. 173 Pa. 190, 33 Atl. 884 (1896). The court also intimated that the fiduciary
power to invest and reinvest, under certain narrow circumstances, might be viewed
as a direction that capital gain should go to income. Cf. Wiltbanls Appeal, 64 Pa. 256
(1870).
106. 253 Pa. 80, 97 AUt. 1029 (1916).
107. 198 Pa. 216, 47 Atl. 1108 (1901).
108. See generally 3 ScoTT, TRusTs § 236.10 (2d ed. 1956) ; Brigham, supra note
5, at 375; Nemmers, supra note 76, at 844; Note, 78 U. PA. L. Rzv. 570 (1930) ; Note,
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assets. In the typical situation, the trust owns shares of stock in a
corporation which, in the course of liquidation, pays one or more
liquidating dividends. If the entire distribution is less than intact
value, it will remain wholly in corpus even though the life tenant is
able to show that part of the distribution is based upon, or derived from,
earnings accrued subsequent to the creation of the trust."0 9 If the
distribution exceeds intact value, the amount distributable to the life
tenant is the excess attributable to accumulated earnings."
The mechanics of a liquidation apportionment are illustrated in
McKeown's Estate " where the trust held stock with an intact value
of $12.22. The company distributed $24.50 per share in liquidation
at a time when the book value was $15.18. The court found that $2.96,
the difference between intact value and book value at the time of the
liquidation, represented accumulated earnings and, therefore, held it
should be paid to the income beneficiary. The $9.32 balance of the
gain was considered a capital accretion and was awarded to principal.
Where the source of the liquidating dividend is the sale of a
franchise," or the sale of all the corporate assets," 3 the amount ex-
ceeding intact value presumptively remains in corpus as based on
capital accretion and not accumulated earnings."14 However, if the
life tenant can prove that there are sufficient accumulated earnings,
he will become entitled to a distribution." If a liquidating dividend
is derived from both capital accretions and earnings, the life tenant
"is entitled to the proportion of such earnings as accrued subsequently
to the testator's death," " i.e., from the beginning of the trust term.
16 VA. L. Rgv. 499 (1930); Comment, 21 U. Ciix. L. Rxv. 454 (1954); RzS'TATt-
mENT, TRusTS § 236(d), comment x (1935) ; Annots., 130 A.L.R. 492, 586-90 (1941),
44 A.L.R.2d 1277, 1304-06 (1955).
109. Sternbergh's Estate, 337 Pa. 342, 10 A.2d 376 (1939).
110. McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, 106 Atl. 189 (1919); Cf. Weschler's Estate,
212 Pa. 508, 61 Atl. 1091 (1905) (involving an unincorporated business).
111. 263 Pa. 78 (1919).
112. Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434 (1882). In this decision the court recognized
that the same apportionment rules apply to partial as to complete liquidations, but held
that the distribution should benefit corpus because of an implication that intact value
might otherwise be impaired. It is significant that the vital fact of the existence of
accumulated earnings does not appear in the reported decision. Brigham, supra note
5, at 375, cites this decision only for the foregoing principles and concludes that "the
burden rests on the life beneficiary to prove the amount of such accumulated earnings
and only to the extent that he does so will he participate in a distribution in liquida-
tion."
113. Graham's Estate, 198 Pa. 216, 47 Atl. 1108 (1901); see Comment, 21 U.
Cxi. L. Rxv. 454, 456 (1954).
114. Eisner's Estate, 175 Pa. 143, 34 Atl. 577 (1896). Cf. Mallory's Estate, 285
Pa. 186, 131 Atl. 714 (1926) where the court held that the entire surplus must be con-
sidered in apportioning a liquidating dividend.
115. Eisner's Estate, supra note 114, at 148, 34 Atl. at 579.
116. Connolly's Estate (No. 1), 198 Pa. 137, 143, 47 Atl. 1125, 1127 (1901).
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In short, if a partial or complete liquidation is the apportionable
event, there is a presumption that the entire proceeds of the liquidation
accrue to principal; the life tenant has the burden of showing affirma-
tively that some portion of the fund distributed is based upon accrued
earnings 117 and that intact value will be preserved.
4. Transfers Pursuant to Reorganization 118
Modern corporate law has only recently emerged from the era
when corporate reorganizations were more or less limited to the form
of statutory merger or consolidation expressly permitted by local law.
Today, many if not most business combinations result from transactions
which legally constitute sales or exchanges. Thus, businesses are now
combined-and existing shareholders retain a "continuity of interest"-
through a transaction whereby the acquiring corporation A issues
shares of its voting stock in exchange for the stock of corporation B
which thereupon becomes the controlled subsidiary of A; or in which A
uses its voting stock to acquire substantially all of the assets of B,
whereupon B is dissolved and new A stock is distributed to B's share-
holders in complete liquidation." 9 The result in each case is essentially
the same as if there had been a merger or consolidation of corporations
A and B. Nevertheless, current law indicates that the traditional
merger or consolidation will not be the occasion for an apportionment,
whereas the other described transactions will be treated as apportionable
events.
In Buist's Estate 120 the court was concerned with a consolidation
of banking institutions pursuant to federal law, whereunder the share-
holders of the constituents received in exchange for their old shares
the new shares of the resulting and enlarged bank. This exchange of
stock was held not to be a transaction giving rise to an apportionment
since "the issuance of the new capital stock is merely the issuance of
new evidence of ownership to the shareholders." In other words, the
receipt of shares of a merged company is not tantamount to a distribu-
tion or division of assets which calls for an apportionment between
life tenant and remainderman. This decision is also significant because
it holds that the right of a dissenting shareholder to demand cash does
not of itself create an apportionable event (although doubtless if cash
117. Lewis Estate, 351 Pa. 576, 41 A.2d 683 (1945).
118. See generally Brigham, supra note 5, at 376; Note, 47 CoLum. L. Rzv. 310
(1947) ; Note, 32 IowA L. Rrv. 521 (1947); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1277, 1308-10 (1955).
119. The stock-for-stock and the stock-for-assets types of reorganizations are
included, together with merger or consolidation, and recapitalization, as the principal
reorganization transactions which are tax-free. IxT. Rzv. CoDs op" 1954, §§ 368, 354.
120. 297 Pa. 537, 147 Atl. 606 (1929).
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was demanded and received there would arise the right to apportion-
ment).
Where the distribution of reorganization stock to the trustee is
not the result of a merger or consolidation, the distribution may fall
within the area of a sale or exchange which requires an apportionment.
Illustrative is Daily's Estate 1"1 in which the corporation had recapital-
ized by means of a transfer of assets to subsidiary companies followed by
a distribution of the subsidiaries' stocks in complete liquidation of the
former parent. Here the "continuity of interest" of the individual
shareholders was more complete than in Buist's Estate (in which the
individual shareholders, through merger with other corporations,
acquired a new interest in corporate-owned assets), and yet the ex-
change resulting from the technical liquidation of the parent was held
to require an apportionment. The same result was reached in Fisher's
Estate ' which involved merely the recapitalization of an existing
company, but in which there was the further justifying factor that the
new stock received as a result of the recapitalization was distributed in
partial discharge of cumulated but unpaid dividends on the old preferred
stock.
The line of demarcation between merger or consolidation and
other reorganization transactions is confirmed by the three decisions
in King Estate "' which, in their order of promulgation, hold that
stock received as the result of a merger cannot be the subject of
apportionment; that the apportionable event will occur only upon a
subsequent sale or similar disposition of the stock received in the
reorganization; and that, in computing the intact value to be pre-
served, one must compare the intact value of the old stock with the
book value of all of the new stock received as a result of the merger
rather than making the comparison on a share-for-share basis.
Final confirmation of the non-apportionment rule in the merger
situation was forthcoming in Jones Estate "2 which, like Buist's Estate,
involved a bank merger, in the course of which earnings were capitalized
as the source of new stock issued. Even though corporate earnings
were thus transmuted into new stock, the fact that the new stock was
issued in a merger was sufficient to exclude the distribution from the
apportionment area. 5 The court returned to the arbitrary and perhaps
121. 323 Pa. 42, 186 Atl. 754 (1936).
122. 344 Pa. 607, 26 A2d 192 (1942).
123. 349 Pa. 27, 36 A.2d 504 (1944) ; 355 Pa. 64, 48 A.2d 858 (1946); 361 Pa.
629, 66 A.2d 68 (1949).
124. 377 Pa. 473, 105 A.2d 353 (1954).
125. Of course, the earnings received from a constituent corporation as the result
of the merger will be considered as a source for future apportionment, e.g., upon the
subsequent declaration by the merger corporation of a stock dividend. Chauncey's Es-
tate, 303 Pa. 441, 154 Ati. 814 (1931).
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archaic concept, first expressed in Buist's Estate, to the effect that an
apportionment can occur only
"upon the happening of any one of four events, namely, (1)
the distribution by the corporation of an extraordinary cash or
stock dividend, or (2) the liquidation of the corporation, or (3) a
sale of the stock by the trustees, or (4) the issuance of stock
rights." 11
It is suggested that non-apportionment in the merger situation is
correct in that the result of replacing an old share with a new "is merely
the issuance of new evidence of ownership to the shareholders .
[and] is not tantamount to a distribution or division of assets which
calls for an apportionment between a life tenant and remainderman." 127
But even more so is this true in the case of a corporate recapitalization
which involves the readjustment of interests of a single and continuing
corporation. Though there might be a technical corporate dissolution
in the course of such a recapitalization, nevertheless, the interests
continue in precisely the same underlying assets.
Although it has been said that federal tax concepts should not
control Pennsylvania apportionment rules,128 it should be recognized
that federal courts, in applying tax laws, have molded continuity of
interest rules which are more in harmony with changing corporate
reorganization practices than are the current apportionment rules. It
is only reasonable that, where the corporate reorganization exchange
produces the net effect of a merger or consolidation, no apportionment
rights should result even though the transaction is cast in the mold of
a sale or exchange.
A realistic judicial approach should limit the right to apportion-
ment resulting from reorganization distributions to those cases where
there is a clear change in the continuity of the shareholder's interest, or
where the distribution is sufficiently similar to a stock dividend that,
as in Fisher's Estate, the new stock is actually distributed in lieu of
dividends otherwise payable in cash."2 9
126. Jones Estate, 377 Pa. 473, 476, 105 A.2d 353, 354 (1954).
127. Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 542, 147 Atl. 606, 608 (1929).
128. Jones Estate, 377 Pa. 473, 475, 105 A.2d 353, 354 (1954).
129. INT. Rxv. CoDm or 1954, § 355, may provide an equivalent to a stock dividend
in the so-called spin-off transaction whereby an existing corporation distributes sep-
arate business assets to a new subsidiary the stock of which may then be distributed
tax-free to the shareholders of the existing corporation. If the subsidiary stock is dis-
tributed without an exchange, a dividend equivalent may result; but if a part of the
stock of the existing corporation is surrendered in exchange for the subsidiary stock,
there might be no apportionable event. It can reasonably be argued that an appor-
tionment exists if, and to the extent that, in a reorganization earned surplus is
capitalized which thereby assumes a substantial equivalent of a stock dividend. See
Soles v. Granger, 174 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1949) ; note 75a supra.
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5. Rights To Subscribe"'
Rights to subscribe to additional shares of a corporate stock at
a price lower than current market value are a valuable asset which can
be realized upon in two ways: sale of the rights for cash, or purchase
of new shares at a discount. The resulting inquiries are whether the
stock rights are merely an incident of the ownership of underlying
shares or whether they are a medium for distributing accumulated
profits; whether life tenant or remainderman must carry the burden
of proof of the apportionment; and when the apportionment should
be made. 31'
Early decisions were conflicting: some held that stock rights were
only a diluting incident of the ownership of the underlying shares and
were not apportionable; 12 other decisions held that the rights were
"manifestly a profit" and "a right incidental to the stock and . .
therefore income." 13 The latter view was adopted in Thompson's
Estate " in which rights were awarded to the life tenants because
surrounding circumstances indicated that the transaction was a disguised
stock dividend. In Nirdlinger's Estate the court announced a rule
that "the life tenant should receive the benefit of the right so far as it
is attributable to earnings that have accumulated during the life interest,
providing the intact value of the corpus be maintained." " In Jones
v. Integrity Trust Co."3 the court applied the rule to an exercise of
stock rights, saying that
"the benefit resulting therefrom must be apportioned in the
same manner as an extraordinary stock dividend would be; that is,
there would be allocated to the corpus of the trust sufficient
[of the new shares] to maintain unimpaired intact value of the
stock held by it, and the life tenant should receive the balance,
130. See generally RzsvATxM4NT, TRUSTS § 236(c), comment w (1935); 3 Scow,
TRUSTS § 236.9 (2d ed. 1956) ; Brigham, Allocation of Receipts of Shares Held in
Trust, 85 U. PA. L. Rgv. 358, 376 (1937) ; Nemmers, supra note 76, at 840; Notes, 83
U. PA. L. REv. 98 (1934), 84 U. PA. L. Ray. 796 (1936) ; Annots., 44 A.L.R.2d 1277,
1302-04 (1955), 130 A.L.R. 492, 570-75 (1941).
131. A distinct question has arisen where the trustee has been given rights to
subscribe to shares of another corporation. Several early cases have held that the
rights, Eisner's Estate, 175 Pa. 143, 34 Atl. 577 (1896), or the profits on the shares
where those rights have been exercised, Kemble's Estate, 201 Pa. 523, 51 Atl. 310
(1902) ; Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. 256 (1870), are income.
132. Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. 264 (1877).
133. Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. 256, 259, 260 (1870).
134. 262 Pa. 278, 105 Atl. 273 (1918). See also Stokes Estate (No. 1), 240 Pa.
277, 87 Atl. 971 (1913); Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 Atl. 438 (1891). In sub-
stance the court considered a declaration of a dividend coupled with a right to sub-
scribe as a stock dividend.
135. 290 Pa. 457, 466, 139 Atl. 200, 203 (1927).
136. 292 Pa. 149, 140 Atl. 862 (1928). This was a declaratory judgment action
in which the case stated was quashed on the ground that it did not appear in the record
whether the rights had been sold or exercised.
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because it represents the corporate earnings which accumulated
after he became entitled to all dividends at any time thereafter
payable out of such accumulations." 117
Subsequently, Waterhouse's Estate"8 applied the same principle to
proceeds of the sale of rights.
Finally, in Hostetter's Trust,'39 the court permitted a trustee to
pay the life tenant his share "of the benefit of the right" in stock
acquired with rights, using book value figures to determine his portion,
although it was indicated that the trustee could not have been required
to apportion until there was a sale.' 40
It is now settled that the values received by a trust as stock rights
must be apportioned, and that the time for apportionment is either when
the rights are sold,' 4' when the new shares are sold,' or, in the
discretion of the trustee, at the time the rights are exercised. 43
The presumptions applicable in this area are not clearly defined.
In some situations the court states that the burden of proof is on the
life tenant, as in the sale of stock.'" In others, if the life tenant shows
that the distribution to him will not impair intact value, he takes all
unless the remainderman shows that it is based in part on capital
appreciation." It has also been said that these sums must be appor-
tioned like an extraordinary stock dividend, i.e., that the burden is on
137. 292 Pa. 149, 153, 140 Atl. 862, 863 (1928).
138. 308 Pa. 422, 162 Atl. 295 (1932). The court found, however, that the value
represented by the rights was capital appreciation rather than retained earnings and,
therefore, the proceeds of the sale of the rights went to corpus. This case is interesting
when compared with Jones v. Integrity Trust Co. In that case, the court denied a
declaratory judgment on the ground that it was not established whether the rights
would be sold or exercised and that such findings were essential to a decision, and then
discussed the exercise of stock rights. And, although the Jones opinion would indicate
a different rule in the case of a sale of rights, the same language was cited and ap-
proved in the Waterhouse case and applied therein to the proceeds of sale.
139. 319 Pa. 572, 181 At. 567 (1935). The principle announced was applied in a
collateral situation where it was sought to surcharge a trustee for distributing shares.
Bard's Estate, 339 Pa. 433, 13 A.2d 711 (1940).
140. Contra, Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 Ati. 352 (1926), which involved
rights to subscribe to shares of a fire company which had suffered a substantial capital
loss and which issued the rights in an effort to raise new capital. The court held that
proceeds of the sale of the rights should be retained in corpus (and at the same time
decided that intact value of the shares should be reduced by the amount of the loss).
141. See Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 429-30, 162 At. 295, 296 (1932).
142. See Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 543, 147 Atl. 606, 608 (1929).
143. Hostetter's Trust, 319 Pa. 572, 575-76, 181 Atl. 567, 568 (1935), where the
court said: "Here the trustees had income-producing shares of stock in their hands
after a purchase such as was contemplated in Jones v. Integrity Trust Co. . . . They
could have sold the stock so purchased and distributed the proceeds to the life tenant
without impairing the intact value. Instead of selling it they allotted the stock in kind
to the life tenant. We see nothing wrong about this . . . and there is nothing in
Buist's Estate . . . that in any way offends this conclusion."
144. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 429-30, 162 Atl. 295, 296 (1932).
145. Noblitt's Estate, 15 Pa. D. & C. 202 (Orphans' Ct. 1931).
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the remainderman to show that the value of the rights stems from
capital appreciation rather than retained earnings. 14 6
6. Dividends on Preferred Stock 147
The issue here concerns preferred stock having cumulative divi-
dend arrearages which are discharged by a lump cash sum or by the
issuance of new stock pursuant to a corporate reorganization. Two
case histories dominate the scene: Fisher's Estate 148 and the three
decisions in King Estate.
141
Fisher's Estate involved apportionment of the proceeds of a sale
of preferred stock which had been received in an exchange of 1.4
shares of new $100 par value five per cent preferred stock for each
old share of $100 par value seven per cent preferred stock with dividend
arrearages of $40.75. The additional par value of the bonus shares
was obtained from an impairment of the common capital stock accounts,
and the remainderman objected to the apportionment because, inter alia,
no part of the sum from which the new stock was created could be
traced to earnings. The court ruled that the life tenant was entitled to
the proceeds of the sale of the bonus shares, stating that,
"We must distinguish between the rights and duties of the stock-
holders with relation to the corporate entity and the respective
rights of life tenants and remaindermen. So considering the
matter, the common stockholders procured available values by
rearrangement of the capital structure of the corporation, all by
proceedings legally conducted. This was a matter of corporation
law. They then transferred those values to the preferred stock-
holders in discharge of rights which such stockholders had to
receive dividends. In fact, in that manner the payment of dividends
to such preferred stockholders was merely anticipated. As between
life tenant and remaindermen the additional stock was in fact
given in discharge of dividends and must be so treated." 1"o
Fisher's Estate thus suggested that, at least where the trust holds
only preferred shares, the concept of "earnings" does not necessarily
mean corporate earnings but can mean earnings by the class of stock
146. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 430, 162 Ati. 295 (1932).
147. See generally Damrau, Apportionment of Stock Dividends in Trusts Created
Prior to 1945, 15 U. PT. L. REv. 34 (1953); Notes, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 424 (1947),
47 Dici. L. Rzv. 56 (1942), 32 IowA L. Izv. 521, 530-39 (1947), 33 VA. L. lzv. 749,
752-54 (1947). See also ScoTT, TRusTs § 236.8 (2d ed. 1956); R1SATiMZNT, TRUSTS
§ 236(a), comments o, p, q (1935) ; Brigham, Principal and Income-Accrued Divi-
dends-Cumndative Preferred Shares, Fiduciary Review, Nov. 1946, p. 1.
148. 344 Pa. 607, 26 A.2d 192 (1942).
149. 349 Pa. 27, 36 A.2d 504 (1944); 355 Pa. 64, 48 A.2d 858 (1946); 361 Pa.
629, 66 A.2d 68 (1949).
150. 344 Pa. 607, 611-12, 26 A.2d 192, 195 (1942).
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involved; and that the trust may receive "income" regardless of the
source of that income within the corporation. The decision further
indicates that intact value does not include dividend arrearages accrued
at the time the trust was created, on the reasoning that the testator's
intention is presumptively to give all dividends to the life tenant. 1
Fisher's Estate also decided that the intact value of preferred
stock is its par value unless capital is impaired; but the court's applica-
tion of this rule seems inconsistent. Impairment of preferred capital
would occur only upon total impairment of the common capital and
reduction of the company's net worth below the liquidation preference.
In Fishers Estate, the preferred was neither impaired at the time the
trust was created nor at the time of the reorganization, for when the
trust was established there were capital stock accounts from which the
new preferred was taken, and at the time of the reorganization, there
was a "legal" creation of new par value preferred. Yet the court
gave the income tenants the proceeds of all the extra shares,'5 2 whereas
if par value had been considered intact value, their portion would have
been substantially less.' What the court in effect held was that, in
an exchange of preferred shares, receipt of the same par value as shares
left in trust will maintain intact value regardless of the actual value of
the new shares.
King Estate .4 involved a testamentary trust which held cumula-
tive preferred stock with arrearages and common stock of the same
company. Pursuant to a reorganization, the trust received for each
share of $100 par value preferred stock with arrearages, one-half share
of $100 par value A preferred stock, one-half share of $100 par value
B preferred stock, and one and one-fourth shares of no par value
common stock. In return for each share of $100 par value common
stock, the trust received one share of no par value common stock.
The majority held first, as in Fishers Estate, that proceeds of the
sale of the common stock received for old preferred stock should go
to the life tenants, providing that intact value was not impaired. It
compared the situation before it to the receipt of a stock dividend, and
viewed the receipt of the new stock as "at least in lieu of, or compen-
sation for, the surrender of the right to receive" back dividends. The
majority further held that, in determining intact value, the entire trust
151. The court thus followed the rules of the New York courts, see, e.g., Thomp-
son v. New York Trust Co., 107 Misc. 245, 177 N.Y. Supp. 299 (Sup. Ct. 1919), and
the Restatement. R.S'rATxmIMNT, Tausvs § 236(a), comment a (1935).
152. $88.23, the average price received, times 38.8, the number of extra shares, or
$3,423.32.
153. The difference between the par value of the 97 original ($9,700) and the
proceeds of the sale of all the new shares ($11,982.04), or $2,282.04.
154. King Estate, 361 Pa. 629, 66 A.2d 68 (1949).
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investment in the company should be considered; and since the re-
organization diluted the old common shares, it was necessary to allot
to corpus enough of the new shares to preserve the old common's
intact value. With respect to preferred shares, the majority followed
the conclusion in fact of Fishers Estate by holding that the exchange
of $100 par value preferred stock for $100 par value preferred stock
is the substitution of identical values. Thus, the majority would use
book value at the time of reorganization to determine the value of the
new common shares, but par value to determine the value of the new
preferred shares. It would lump together the investments in common
and preferred for purposes of determining whether the old common
shares were diluted, but would treat preferred separately in determining
whether receipt of the new preferred shares would maintain the intact
value of the old preferred.
The dissent, on the other hand, noted that the new preferred
shares were sold for less than their intact (par) value, and argued
that proceeds of the sale of the common stock should therefore have
been applied toward satisfaction of this impairment. In its view it was
improper to hold that intact value of the original preferred shares could
be measured exactly by the new preferred simply because they had the
same par value. The dissent would follow the language of Fisher's
Estate, that intact value equals par value except where there is an im-
pairment, and that therefore new shares of the same intrinsic value must
be alloted to corpus before anything can be distributed to the life tenants.
7. Termination of a Trust: Who Is Entitled?
It has been held that termination of the trust will not of itself
require an apportionment.' 55 When shares held in trust are released
to the remaindermen, the stock is freed from any and all claim by the
life tenant even though the corporation later pays a dividend from
income earned and retained during his tenancy. The remaindermen
are entitled to all the value inherent in the stock immediately upon the
dissolution of the life tenancy,"" except as to regular dividends which
are specifically provided for by statute. 5 ' On the other hand, if the
155. See RrsTAT Z NT, TRusTs § 238 (1935) ; 3 ScoT,, TRUSTS § 236.13 (1956) ;
Comment, 86 U. PA. L. Rzv. 111 (1937). This issue has not been specifically litigated
in Pennsylvania, but it is reasonably arguable that an apportionment should be made.
156. Neafie's Estate, 325 Pa. 561, 191 Atl. 56 (1937).
157. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 633-34, repealed by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3471-
85 (Purdon 1950). The same result has been reached in the unproductive real estate
cases, where the right of the life tenant to an apportionment of the proceeds of the
sale of unproductive real estate will not continue after termination of the trust; other-
wise, the remainder may be clogged and the intentions of the testator would be frus-
trated. Spear's Estate, 333 Pa. 199, 3 A.2d 789 (1939); Miller's Estate, 43 Pa. D. &
C. 565 (Orphans' Ct. 1941); Myer's Trust, 35 Pa. D. & C. 492 (Orphans' Ct. 1939).
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apportionable event occurred during the life of the trust, but the
apportionment was never made, the termination of the trust will not
cut off the right of the income beneficiary., 8
Dividends Declared After the Termination of the Life Tenant's
Interest.'6 9 Prior to 1947, it was provided by statute that where a
corporation pays dividends "regularly declared at uniform intervals"
over a period of years, the amounts of such dividends will be
considered accruing from day-to-day and will, therefore, be appor-
tioned to the death of the life tenant. 6 ' This principle did not
include all ordinary dividends, since those which could not be charac-
terized as "regularly declared at uniform intervals" went under the
common law to the tenant in possession at the time they were de-
clared."8 ' Determination of the type of dividend involved in this
apportionment situation rested in the discretion of the lower court. 6 '
When the trust continues into a succeeding income estate, an
extraordinary dividend received during the second income tenancy will
be apportioned in part to the first income tenant upon a showing that
the source of the dividend is income earned and retained during his
tenancy.1
3
Where, however, the termination of the income estate terminates
the trust, the income tenants have no claim on dividends subsequently
declared, even though they can show the distribution came from funds
earned and retained during their tenancy. Although allowance of such
an apportionment would seem to follow the Pennsylvania rule "to its
ultimate logical conclusion" 164 the courts have declined to go so far. 65
158. Daily's Estate, 323 Pa. 42, 186 At. 754 (1936) ; Kenny Estate, 7 FiD. Ri,.
354 (1957).
159. See 3 Scowr, TRUSTS § 236 (2d ed. 1956); Comment, 86 U. PA. L. R.v. 111
(1937); Annot., 141 A.L.R. 1466 (1942).
160. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 633-34, repealed by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3471-
85 (Purdon 1950). The phrase quoted is not the language of the act which speaks of
"All . . . dividends of any . . . personal property .... but is a limiting interpreta-
tion placed upon this provision in Given's Estate, 323 Pa. 456, 460-61, 185 Atl. 778, 780
(1936) and followed in Nirdlinger's Estate (No. 1), 327 Pa. 160, 165-67, 193 Atl.
33, 36 (1937).
161. Nirdlinger's Estate (No. 1), mpra note 160.
162. Ibid.
163. See Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. 436, 146 At. 111 (1929) ; see also the discus-
sion of apportionment among successive income beneficiaries at p. 181 infra.
164. Cf. 3 ScOTT, TRUSTS § 236.6 (2d ed. 1956).
165. See Green v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 329 Pa. 169, 196 Atl. 32 (1938);
Given's Estate, 323 Pa. 456, 185 Atl. 778 (1936); Waterman's Estate, 279 Pa. 491,
124 Atl. 166 (1924). Yates's Estate, 281 Pa. 178, 126 Atl. 254 (1924) is ostensibly
contra, but distinguishable in that the parties stipulated that dividends paid after the
life estate ended were to be treated similarly to those declared during the period of the
income tenancy. Cf. Faught, Statutory Solution of the Problem of Allocation Between
Life Tenant and Reinainderman, 11 TEmP. L.Q. 139, 141, 154 (1937).
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II. SPECIAL PROBLEMS
A. Effect of Terms Used in the Trust Instrument
Since the Pennsylvania rule of apportionment is an attempt to
give effect to the intention of the testator,166 his intention, as expressed
in the language of the trust instrument, will be honored providing
that it does not direct an unlawful disposition. 6 '
Language supporting an apportionment to the life tenant may
take a variety of forms, as for example, a direction to convert to cash
and distribute profits to the life tenant, 6 " or a limitation upon the
remainderman to a sum certain, thereby leaving to others an increase
in principal value of the investments." 9
More frequently, however, the language of the testator is construed
to favor the remainderman. Thus, where the trustee is directed to
distribute only "income," but is instructed to collect a more broadly
described group of increments such as "dividends, accretions, profits
or benefits," the use of the narrower term "income" for distribution
purposes will be indicative of an intent that the life tenant be denied
apportionment benefits. 7° Occasionally the testator will affirmatively
indicate that apportionable items shall remain in corpus, as where he
states that "extra dividends . . shall be added to and form part
of the principal fund. . . ." " or "the principal and any accrued
income" shall pass to the remainderman at the death of the life tenant.
"1 2
The testator may also define the intact value date to be used for
apportionment purposes. Thus, where the testator directs certain
income payments to be made to the life tenant "until the respective
trust funds are established," the intact value will be determined as of
the date that the trust is established, that is, the day when the securities
166. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
167. A trust provision that certain receipts shall be considered principal by the
trustee might violate the rule against accumulations, PA. STATr. ANN. tit. 20, § 3251
(Purdon 1950), if the receipts include items which call for an apportionment. Maris's
Estate, 301 Pa. 20, 151 Atl. 577 (1930). Decisions in this area consider various accumu-
lations such as the direction that all the stock dividends shall be considered principal,
Maris's Estate, supra; that allotments of bonds, stock, or stock dividends shall be
treated as principal. Warden Trust, 382 Pa. 311, 115 A.2d 159 (1955) ; and that stock
dividends or proceeds of the sale of rights should be considered as principal, Wentz's
Estate, 12 Pa. D. & C. 398 (Orphans" Ct. 1929). Where such directions would not be
repugnant to the rule against accumulations the courts will effect the expressed inten-
tion of the testator. Maris's Estate, supra at 28, 151 Atl. at 579.
168. Quay's Estate, 253 Pa. 80, 97 Atl. 1029 (1916).
169. Middleton's Appeal, 103 Pa. 92, 96 (1883).
170. Ferguson Trust, 354 Pa. 367, 47 A.2d 245 (1946) ; cf. Flaccus's Estate, 283
Pa. 185, 129 Atl. 74 (1925).
171. Ferguson Trust, supra note 170. But see note 165 supra.
172. Yates's Estate, 281 Pa. 178, 126 Atl. 254 (1924); cf. Coffman's Estate
(No. 2), 31 Pa. D. & C. 93 (Orphans' Ct. 1937).
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are turned over to the trustee,1' whereas otherwise it will be deter-
mined as of the date of the testator's death. 74
B. Successive Income Beneficiaries
In some instances, trustee's receipts from stock may require
apportionments of amounts attributable to income between successive
income tenants. Where the apportionable proceeds are derived from
sale or disposition of the stock, there will be an apportionment between
successive beneficiaries based on the amounts earned and retained
during their respective tenancies, apparently with no presumption that
all should go to one life tenant or the other.' Where, however, the
receipts stem from a corporate distribution, the entire amount appor-
tionable to income will go to the current life tenant unless the prior
life tenant can prove that part of the distribution was made from funds
earned and retained during his tenancy. 7 7  In either case, the mechanics
of apportionment are within the discretion of the lower court.
7
1
Apportionment between successive life tenants of proceeds of the
more complex apportionable events would depend on characterization
of the receipts in question. Thus, in one case,179 the court treated the
receipt of rights as an extraordinary dividend, and it can be expected
that apportionment of the proceeds of reorganizations would similarly
depend on the type of transaction involved. 8
C. Apportionment of "Capital Gains Dividends" From Investments in
Mutual Funds
Apportionment of capital gains dividends from investments in
mutual funds have involved a multitude of questions for which there
are, as yet, few answers.' 8' The court in Lovett Estate 182 held that
173. Frick Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 247 (Orphans' Ct. 1955).
174. Flinn's Estate, 310 Pa. 206, 165 Atl. 31 (1932).
175. See Brigham, supra note 130, at 381; Comment, 86 U. PA. L. Pitv. 111
(1937); Annot., 159 A.L.R. 589 (1945); Trusts-Apportionent-Calh Dividends-Suc-
cessive Life Tenants, Fiduciary Review, Aug. 1937, p. 1.
176. See, e.g., Neafie's Estate, 325 Pa. 561, 568, 570, 191 Atl. 56, 60-61 (1937).
177. Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. 436, 146 Atl. 111 (1929); cf. Fisher's Estate, 344
Pa. 607, 26 A.2d 192 (1942). In order to take a share the prior life tenant must show
more than that the market value of the shares had risen during his tenancy, or that the
corporation's surplus had increased. See Graham's Estate, supra.
178. Neafie's Estate, 325 Pa. 561, 570, 191 Atl. 56, 61 (1937).
179. See Neafie's Estate, supra note 178.
180. The problem of apportionment of proceeds from corporate reorganizations
between successive income beneficiaries has not been specifically dealt with by the
courts. However, the receipt of stock pursuant to a merger was considered an ex-
traordinary stock dividend in Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. 436, 146 Atl. 111 (1929).
181. Only one Pennsylvania case, Lovett Estate, 1 FiD. Rm. 543 (1951), has con-
sidered this issue. The problem was considered in New York in It re Byrne's Estate,
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such dividends should go to the income tenant, irrespective of Internal
Revenue Code labeling, stating that:
".. [T] he securities held are treated by the managers as funds
to be turned over in the normal management of the business ...
The gain resulting from turning over of any portfolio asset by
an investment company is income occurring in the ordinary
conduct and course of such business." 13
The decision was supported by a determination that the buying and
selling of securities is standard procedure in an investment company's
operations and that all profits derived from these activities are income,
not enhancements of principal.
The reasoning in Lovett Estate has been criticized on the ground
that a capital item has been disposed of, and that such a policy would
cause a depletion of the estate since the "capital gains" are forced out
of the fund by the revenue laws,"' yet there is no corresponding treat-
ment of losses to encourage maintenance of the fund.' 5 It has been
suggested that the allocation should depend upon the management
policies of the fund..' Thus, the trustee might attempt to determine
whether the mutual fund is managed conservatively (retaining capital
gains in principal) or speculatively (where all capital gains go to
income). But this in turn has been criticized because it is too uncertain
a test, and would require the trustee to place every payment in corpus
as a matter of self-protection.
It is questionable whether securities held by a mutual fund can be
considered as classical portfolio investments. Mutual fund invest-
ments are carried at market value, not cost, which creates doubt as to
whether they are true capital assets. Similar doubt arises from the
81 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Surr. 1948). The two principal approaches to the problem are dis-
cussed in Shattuck, Capital Gain Distributions, Principal or Income, 88 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 160 (1949), which is a critique of the Byrne decision; Young, Dissent on
Capital Gain Distributions, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 280 (1949), which is an answer to
Mr. Shattuck's position; Shattuck, Further Comment on Capital Gain Distriutions, 88
TRUSTS & ESTATES 429 (1949), which is a reply to Mr. Young. Ewart, Principal and
Income Problems of Trustees With Mutual Fund Dividends, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES
1025 (1956), discusses apportionment of income, but not the question of whether capi-
tal gain distributions should be considered income or principal. Rogers, Capital Gain
Distribution Clauses To Eliminate Question of Allocating Investment Company Divi-
dends, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES 300 (1951) ; Anderson, Should Capital Gains Distribu-
tions Be Prhipal or Income, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES 531 (1951), discuss the problem
generally, and recommend provisions for use in trust instruments where funds may
be invested in mutual fund shares. The question of the apportionment of common
trust funds raises even more difficult problems. See also Lashley v. Lashley, Equity
No. 23920, Alleghany Co. Circ. Ct. Md., Nov. 1956.
182. 1 Fro. REP. 543 (1951).
183. Id. at 545-46.
184. See INI!. Rxv. CoDE or 1954, §§ 852 b 3 (B), (C).
185. See Young, supra note 181.
186. Ibid.
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fact that mutual fund holdings are bought and sold like working capital,
not kept for years like the fixed capital assets of a trading or manu-
facturing business. It might be better to say that the mutual fund is a
unique business entity and should be treated as such; otherwise, pre-
conceptions that one might bring to the subject of apportionments may
have too great an effect.187 It is not clear whether the Internal Revenue
Code provisions really will work a depletion of the capital fund,' nor
is it certain that the dichotomy between trading funds and conservative
funds is well taken, for values in the modem securities markets con-
stantly change, and even conservative fund investments are traded
in order to maintain minimal income standards.
For apportionment purposes, it would seem unreal to view a share
in a mutual fund as a pro rata ownership -of the securities; rather, it
would seem that mutual fund shares should be treated like any other
investment, s9 and that realized increments within the fund are income,
for the mutual fund is, after all, in the business of investing money and
spreading risk capital in such a way as best to afford a broad basis
of investment. On the other hand, in some cases, where stock is
sold or where the fund distributes stock, there might be cause for
some inquiry into the effect of the distribution on intact value.
D. Income Earned During the Administration of an Estate
While income earned during the administration of an estate does
not present an apportionment problem in the strict sense of that word,
it is closely related and helpful to a full understanding of the appor-
tionment problem.
The question is whether the income beneficiaries of a residuary
trust are to receive income earned by the estate on principal funds
used to pay costs of administration, debts and pecuniary legacies (over
and above the interest due on such legacies). A majority of states
hold that the income beneficiary of a residuary trust is entitled only
to the income from the residue, and that other income of the estate
goes to principal,'9° because such a result is said to reflect more accu-
rately the testator's intention.'' The minority (including Pennsyl-
vania) hold that the life tenant is entitled to all income earned by the
187. This is evident from a series of articles written on this subject, Shattuck
and Young, supra note 181. Mr. Shattuck's comments reflect the Massachusetts rule
that capital gains are retained in principal, whereas Mr. Young's discussion reflects
the Pennsylvania rule.
188. See Young, supra note 181.
189. See, e.g., Lovett Estate, 1 Fnm. Rr P. 543 (1951).
190. See, e.g., RESTATEmNT, TRUSTS § 234, comment g (1935); 3 Sco'rr, TRUSTS
§ 234.4, at 1788 (2d ed. 1956).
191. Ibid.
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estate during the administration.' 92 This view is justified as favoring
the primary objects of the testator's bounty and as being easier to
administer, especially in view of the difficulty in determining what
constitutes income on a residue not yet determined."
No Pennsylvania cases have considered this problem, but the
Fiduciaries Act of 1949 94 provides that "All income from real and
personal estate earned during the period of administration and not
payable to others shall be distributed pro rata among the income
beneficiaries of any trust created out of the residuary estate.. "
The commissioners' comment " indicates that this is a restatement of
the common law, for it notes that
"[T]here is no statutory precedent for this section. However, it
follows the usual practice of having the persons entitled to the
income of the residuary estate receive the income gains or bear
the income burdens during the period of administration, and in
not restricting their income to income on the net share ultimately
received by them. Any other rule is very difficult of applica-
tion. . . . Since income is distributed to 'income beneficiaries'
we avoid any possible claim that any part of it should be
capitalized.. " 196
E. The Apportionable Income Item as a Vested Right 197
The Principal and Income Act of 1947,"19 which by its terms is
to ". . . govern the ascertainment of income and principal and the
apportionment of receipts . . . in all cases where a principal has
been established.. ,, 199 prescribes rules quite different from the
common-law Pennsylvania rules of apportionment. Thus, the act
allocates to income all receipts other than shares of the same kind and
rank as those held by the trust, 00 whereas under the common law such
192. 3 Scor, TRUSTS § 234.4, at 1789 (2d ed. 1956).
193. Ibid.
194. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 20, § 320.753 (d) (Purdon 1950).
195. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 20, commissioners' comment, § (d), at 421 (Purdon
1950). The comment cites R sTAT5 MN TRusrs § 234, comment g (1935); 33 VA. L.
PRv. 368 (1947) ; 158 A.L.R. 441 (1945).
196. The comment cites Bennett's Estate, 29 Pa. Dist. 148 (1920). This problem
is no longer important in Pennsylvania, so far as the common law is concerned, for
the Uniform Principal & Income Act applies to all administrations begun after 1945,
but might still be applicable in other states following the Pennsylvania case law.
197. See Brigham, Apportionment-Trusts Created Before May 3, 1945-Guides
for Trustees, Fiduciary Review, Aug. 1955, p. 1; Apportionent-Stock Dividends-
Principal and Income Acts, Fiduciary Review, July 1949, p. 1.
198. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.1 (Purdon Supp. 1956). For a discussion of
the effect of this act on the apportionment problem, see Principal and Income Act of
1947, Fiduciary Review, Aug. 1947, p. 1; id. Sept. 1948, p. 1. The foregoing act super-
seded the Uniform Principal and Income Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3471-3485
(Purdon 1950).
199. Id. § 3470.2.
200. Id. § 3470.3 (1).
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distributions may be apportionable between principal and income."'
Moreover, the act provides that dividends paid in shares of the same
kind and rank are to be retained in principal,' 2 while the common-law
rule required that such dividends, insofar as they represent profits
earned and retained during the income tenancy, would go to the life
beneficiary. °  And where the prior case law required an apportion-
ment of the proceeds of a sale of trust-held stock,' the act provides
that in the absence of a contrary proper direction such proceeds be
deemed principal." 5
It is clear that if the act had been retroactively applied there would
have been a need for change in the accounting procedures of all trustees
whose trusts were created prior to its enactment. Depending on the
apportionable event involved, this might have affected adversely the
rights of remaindermen or of income tenants. It is not surprising,
therefore, that soon after the act took effect the question of its applica-
bility to pre-existing trusts was raised.
This issue first came before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Crawford Estate" in which it was held that, under the Pennsylvania
apportionment rule, the life tenant of a trust created prior to the
enactment of the Principal and Income Act possessed a vested right
to receive a proper portion of a stock dividend or other nominally
capital increment; and that the act could not constitutionally deprive the
life tenant of this apportionment right. The remaindermen had argued
that the apportionment interest of the life tenant "is contingent, inchoote
and a mere expectancy, which the Legislature may constitutionally
modify or destroy";" °0 to which the court replied that a "gift of an
equitable life estate in "income' is a grant of a vested property interest,
[which the] Legislature may not thereafter qualify or ex-
tinguish.. " 208 and further that it could not ". . accept the
remaindermen's contention that the life tenant's property right is
inchoate or a mere expectancy simply becausle the quantum of income
may vary upon application of the Pennsylvania Apportionment Rule." 219
201. See pp. 166-68, 171-73 supra.
202. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5 (Purdon Supp. 1956).
203. See pp. 166-68, 171-73 mtpra.
204. See pp. 168-69 .rpra.
205. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.3 (Purdon Supp. 1956).
206. 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949); see also Warden Trust, 382 Pa. 311, 115
A.2d 159 (1955) ; Steele Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 103 A.2d 409 (1954) ; Jones Estate, 377
Pa. 473, 105 A.2d 353 (1954) ; Pew Trust, 362 Pa. 468, 67 A.2d 129 (1949).
207. Id. 461, 67 A.2d at 126.
208. Id. 463, 67 A.2d at 127.
209. Id. 465, 67 A.2d at 128.
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This decision was later held applicable in Warden Trust to a case
where the securities involved had been purchased after the effective date
of the Principal and Income Act.2 10 In both cases the trust instruments
contained provisions that stock dividends should be treated as principal,
but the court disregarded these directions because they required an
invalid accumulation of income forbidden by the Act of 1853.211 The
life tenant was then held to have a vested right to these accumula-
tions."1 The result is awkward because both decisions apply the
apportionment rule based on the intention of the testator 2 13 to do just
what the testator had expressly directed should- not be done. Yet this
inconsistency is doubtless due to the requirements of the anti-accumula-
tions statute 4 rather than to any fallacy in the court's reasoning.
But what effect will Crawford Estate have on a trust established
after the effective date of the act by exercise of a power of appointment
existing within the framework of a trust created prior to that date?
So far as general powers are concerned, it is arguable that such trusts
will be subject to the act because the appointees under the exercised
power cannot be said to have acquired a vested interest prior to the
enactment of the statute. In fact the only persons with any interest
traceable to the earlier trust's creation would be those taking in default
of appointment.215
The answer is less apparent in the case of special powers. The
Pennsylvania courts have held that, for purposes of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, the exercise of a special power of appointment relates
back to the time when the power was granted. 1' It might be argued,
therefore, that the interest which vests by the exercise of the power
should be considered vested from the time that the power was granted.
On the other hand, it is one thing to forbid a testator or settlor to
extend his control (qua the Rule Against Perpetuities) through the
use of a special power; it is quite another to say that the interests vest
from the time the special power is granted via the relation back
210. 382 Pa. 311, 115 A.2d 159 (1955).
211. Pa. Sess. Laws 1853, No. 304, -at 503.
212. See PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.8(b) (1) (Purdon 1950) (repealed by Pa.
Sess. Laws 1955, No. 347, at 1075). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.7 (Purdon
Supp. 1956).
213. See pp. 159-60, 180-81 supra.
214. See note 209 supra. Following the decision in Maris's Estate, 301 Pa. 20, 15
Atl. 577 (1930), the Act of May 25, 1939, P.L. 201 permitted the accumulation of
substantially all apportionable items held in trusts created thereafter. The Estates Act
of April 24, 1947, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.6 (Purdon 1950) limited the accumu-
lation of items otherwise apportionable to extraordinary dividends and stock rights.
The Act of Feb. 17, 1956, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 301.6, 301.7 (Purdon Supp. 1956)
entirely eliminated the rule against accumulations in this respect.
215. See note 207 supra and discussion in text
216. Cf. Hays's Estate, 288 Pa. 348, 135 Atl. 626 (1927).
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doctrine. Even where the testator restricts the special power to a
narrow class, no one member of the class can be said to possess a
vested right, since the donee of the power can defeat the interest of
any member either by exercising it in favor of other members or by
declining to exercise it and allowing the property to pass in default of
appointment.
Admittedly, where the testator has established a trust and directed
that income should go to a life beneficiary, the meaning of "income"
should not be changed during the administration of the trust. But in
the power of appointment situation the testator has not directed that
the income should go exclusively in an inflexible manner; he merely
has said that at a future date another person may determine its
devolution among a limited group. In effect, the testator has designated
the donee of the power as his alter ego to determine the income distribu-
tion at a future date; and if that date be after the effective date of the
Principal and Income Act, it is not unreasonable to regard the ap-
pointee's interest as having vested after the act which, therefore, be-
comes applicable as a limitation upon that income interest. The
opinions in Crawford Estate and Warden Trust speak only of the
vested rights of the beneficiary. And, so far as a frustration of the
testator's desires is concerned, such an application would seem much
less drastic than the conversion of a fee tail into a fee simple or the
abolition of dower, both of which were noted in Crawford Estate as
interests which are inchoate and which the legislature may modify or
terminate 17
The applicability of the Principal and Income Act of 1947 and its
predecessor, the Estate Act of 1945, to interests coming into enjoyment
after the effective date of those acts, although pursuant to trusts created
prior thereto, properly appears to depend upon whether such interests
were previously vested. Thus, if the donee does not exercise his
power of appointment and beneficiaries take in default thereof, an
interest so acquired would be vested subject to divestment.2 18  It
would follow that any apportionment rights of such a beneficiary would
be controlled by the prior case law.
Determination of the existence of a vested interest should also
be the key to the solution of the apportionment problem in substantially
similar situations, such as a revocable inter vivos life insurance trust,10
217. 362 Pa. 458, 464-65, 67 A.2d 124, 128 (1949).
218. Freeman's Estate (No. 1), 35 Pa. Super. 185 (1908), aff'd, 280 Pa. 273, 124
At1. 435 (1924).
219. Conway Trust, 7 FID. Rri. 467 (1957), in which a pre-1954 revocable inter
vivos life insurance trust was unfunded until the death of the settlor after 1945; and
the law at such death was held controlling. See also Riley v. Wirth, 313 Pa. 362, 169
Atl. 139 (1933).
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an irrevocable inter vivos life insurance trust,' ° a revocable trust,22
a case where a pre-1945 trust has assets poured over into it by a post-
1945 will or other disposition,' and a tentative trust of the type
common in Pennsylvania.=
F. Allocation of Income Held in Trust at the Termination of Income
Tenancy
There is a strong presumption, favoring the life tenant, that
"where there is an absolute gift of a thing, later words in the same
instrument will not operate to reduce the estate thus given, unless it is
reasonably certain that such was the intention of the donor." " Thus,
where income is held in the trust but not paid out at the termination of
the life tenancy, the heirs of the life tenants will take even though the
will or trust deed states that remaindermen should take the "accumulated
income" at the life tenant's death,' or that "any undistributed ac-
cumulations of income" should go to remaindermen. 2 ' The rationale
of these decisions is that the phrases used are too vague to rebut the
strong presumption that the testator intended all income received
by the trust during the life tenancy to go to the income tenant.
This attitude is also reflected in Mallory's Estate,2 27 where the
court held a direction that the remainderman receive "unpaid income
and dividends" should be interpreted as dividends not received by the
220. In the case of Knoche v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 317 Pa. 370, 176 Atl. 230
(1934), the court said that where the right to change the beneficiary under an insur-
ance policy had not been expressly reserved, the named beneficiary holds a vested in-
terest subject to divestment in the event of his death before the insured. It would
seem to follow, therefore, that the prior case law would apply if an irrevocable insur-
ance trust contained policies providing the beneficiary with a vested interest as de-
scribed.
221. In McKean Estate, 366 Pa. 192, 77 A.2d 447 (1951), the widow elected to
take against the will under the Estates Act of April 24, 1947, PA. STATr. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 301.11 (Purdon 1950), and the court held that her election did not extend to a pre-
1945 inter vivos revocable trust because such trust had created interests which were
not merely expectancies but which were vested subject to divestment.
222. Where a pre-1945 trust is increased by a pour-over from a post-1945 dis-
position, it would be reasonable to segregate the two groups of assets and respectively
apply to them the pre-1945 and post-1945 apportionment rules. A comparative situation
is found in Vederman Estate, 78 Pa. D. & C. 207 (Orphans' Ct. 1951), wherein a
widow was permitted to include in her election to take against the will under the Act
of April 24, 1947, those assets which were contributed after 1947 to a trust created
prior thereto. (The widow also reached the pre-1945 assets but only because the trust
was deemed to be in the nature of a testamentary disposition.)
223. Iafolla Estate, 380 Pa. 391, 110 A.2d 380 (1945), states that a tentative trust
creates no vested interest because the trust is effectuated only by the subsequent death
of the settlor. A true revocable trust is distinguishable in that it is held to create a
vested interest subject to divestment through the act of revocation by the settlor.
224. See Mallory's Estate, 285 Pa. 186, 189, 131 At. 714, 715 (1926).
225. Yates's Estate, 281 Pa. 178, 126 Atl. 254 (1924); Kenney Estate, 7 Fmo.
Rim. 354 (1957).
226. Coffman's Estate (No. 2), 31 Pa. D. & C. 93, 95 (Orphans' Ct. 1937).
227. 285 Pa. 186, 131 At. 714 (1926).
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trust, not dividends received but not paid to the income tenant; and
in Thaws Estate,"8 which held that a direction in a trust instrument
for semi-annual payments of income would require an apportionment
of income accrued between the last income payment and termination
of the life estate.
G. Charitable Trusts
When the sole beneficiary of a perpetual trust is a charity, there
usually is but one object of the testator's bounty. However, the inten-
tion of the testator, which is the basic guide in apportionment matters,
may be construed in varying ways. For example, in Jordan Estate "
the trust's capital gain was awarded to income beneficiaries (a church
and church academy) because the testator could not have intended
"the building up of a large fund for the benefit of a charity or charities
of which he had no knowledge . . . [or] connection . . . and to
whom under the cy pres . . . interest and income would inure in the
event of the non-existence of the Church and Academy.. ,, 230
In Girard's Estate"' and Trexler's Estate,232 the trusts were for the
benefit of public bodies less likely the subject of cy pres, and the courts
awarded the benefit to principal.
It seems evident that the permanency of the beneficiary is the
basis for reconciling these apparently conflicting decisions. The bene-
ficiaries in the latter cases were the cities of Philadelphia and Allentown
which, in one form or another, are likely to continue; whereas the
beneficiary in Jordan Estate was a private organization which might
be terminated and supplanted under the cy pres doctrine with another
private organization outside the testator's intention.
H. Request for Apportionment of Items Included in Prior
Adjudication
Audit of a fiduciary's account is a formal legal proceeding in
which all interested parties should appear to present objections which
they may have to a fiduciary's management, following which the court
adjudicates the accountant's stewardship for the period covered by the
account. All competent interested beneficiaries, upon receiving notice
that an account- has been filed, are charged not only with their actual
228. 73 PiTT. L.J. 289 (1925).
229. 2 Fin. Rnp. 561 (1952). See also Principal ad Income-Apportionnent-
Capital Gains-Charitable Trusts, Fiduciary Review, Nov. 1952, p. 1.
230. Id. at 566.
231. 49 Pa. D. & C. 217 (Orphans' Ct. 1945).
232. 32 Pa. D. & C. 427 (Orphans' Ct. 1938).
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knowledge of the affairs of the estate, but also with knowledge of all that
could have been discerned by the exercise of reasonable diligence."
However, even after adjudication, an audit may be reviewed in
Pennsylvania through (1) a petition for review; (2) a petition to the
orphans' court to correct its records; or (3) the use of different ac-
counting procedures or exceptions at a later audit.
1. Petition for Review
Since 1840 a Pennsylvania statute has authorized interested
parties to petition the orphans' court, within five years, for review of
certain decisions." 4 Even though the statute is couched in general
terms, until recently a review of a prior proceeding was not granted
in every case as a matter of right." Rather, courts considered the
statute as a provision designed to confer upon them a type of equity
jurisdiction which called "for a dispensation of equity's grace, and not
for the recognition of a legal right . . . [and] consequently, before
equity will grant relief, 'it must appear that good conscience and
substantial justice will require it.. ,' " ' Review as a matter
of right had been limited to cases where an error of law appears on
the face of the record, where new matter has arisen or "where justice
and equity require and no one will be injured thereby." 17 However,
subject to the five year limitation period, Stotesbury's Estate 's implies
that the right of review is mandatory and that as long as an appor-
tionable item remains within reach of the court it must be awarded to
the life tenant if he demands it in a proper proceeding.
233. Mershon Estate, 364 Pa. 549, 73 A.2d 686 (1950).
234. Act of October 13, 1840, P.L. 1, § 1, limited to settled accounts; in the 1917
act, reprinted in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 321.1143 (Purdon 1950), and the 1949 act,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.721 (Purdon 1950), now in force, the review extends to
"any part of the account, or of an auditor's report, or of the adjudication, or of any
decree of distribution...."
235. See Riddle's Estate, 19 Pa. 431 (1852).
236. Stewart Estate, 358 Pa. 434, 439, 58 A.2d 42, 44 (1948).
237. Bailey's Estate, 291 Pa. 421, 424, 140 At. 145, 146 (1927) ; Priestley's Ap-
peal, 127 Pa. 420, 17 Aft. 1084 (1889) ; Scott's Appeal, 112 Pa. 427, 5 At. 671 (1886) ;
Riddle's Estate, 19 Pa. 431 (1852). In addition to review as a matter of right, it
sometimes is said that review will be allowed as a matter of grace where new evidence
is presented (apparently distinguishable in some shadowy way from new matter)
which bears on the issues. It seems well established that laches will preclude consider-
ation of a petition for review, Michener's Estate, 225 Pa. 66, 73 Atl. 1059 (1909),
where petitioner alleged no notice of the audit but accepted its benefits and did not
file a petition for 4 years and 9 months; Kachline's Estate, 7 Pa. Super. 163 (1898),
where review was not sought for more than 3 years after discovery of grounds; Poh's
Estate, 12 Pa. Dist. 160 (1903), involving a delay of 14 months in pressing a claim
raised at an adjudication in which plaintiff was represented by counsel; see also Gott-
shalk's Estate, 344 Pa. 135, 23 A.2d 454 (1942); Clothier's Estate, 18 Phila. 230
(1887); cf. Sherwood's Estate, 206 Pa. 465, 56 AtI. 20 (1903); Cassatt's Estate, 45
Pa. D. & C. 185 (Orphans' Ct. 1942); Stocker's Estate, 25 Pa. Dist. 1013 (1916).
238. 387 Pa. 591, 128 A.2d 587 (1957).
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Moreover, review is possible even after expiration of the five-year
period in the case of a fraud 2 which has operated "to prevent the
fiduciary or 'any person interested' from taking action within the
five years. . . ." " But, to obtain such a review, the petitioner
must prove both the fraud and the reasons why it was not discovered
within the five-year statutory period.
2 41
2. Petition To Correct the Record
Orphans' courts have an inherent equitable power to correct their
records.2 This power will be liberally exercised,2 especially "where
no rights have changed in consequence of the decree."" The power
of the court to correct its own records extends not further than the
five-year period permitted by the statutes discussed previously.2"
The current function of the proceeding is to provide a remedy in those
cases not covered by the statutory remedies.246
3. Review by Later Accounting
While in a second accounting the auditing judge is not bound by
erroneous conclusions of law in the preceding account,247 nevertheless,
finality will attach to a previous finding of fact if the prior proceeding
had "properly call [ed] to the attention of the parties the specific matters
to which they must object, if dissatisfied." 248 Moreover, the five-year
239. Hamilton Estate, 351 Pa. 419, 41 A2d 567 (1945).
240. Thorne's Estate, 344 Pa. 503, 510, 25 A.2d 811, 815 (1942).
241. Netter Estate, 68 Pa. D. & C. 309 (Orphans' Ct. 1949) ; cf. Thorne's Estate,
supra note 240; Daub's Estate, 313 Pa. 35, 169 Atl. 379 (1933). The act also provides
that review is not available to alter a distribution of funds paid pursuant to a decree,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320, 1401 (Purdon 1950), but this would not be a bar in a
proceeding to surcharge an accountant for misappropriated property not accounted
for and, therefore, not within the decree of confirmation. Kinter's Appeal, 62 Pa. 318
(1869) ; cf. Hamilton Estate, 351 Pa. 419, 41 A.2d 567 (1945) ; Chappel's Estate, 264
Pa. 486, 107 At. 846 (1919).
242. Gerlach Estate, 364 Pa. 207, 214-15, 72 A.2d 271, 275 (1950); Stetson's
Estate, 305 Pa. 62, 65, 155 Atl. 856, 857 (1931) ; Huff's Estate, 300 Pa. 64, 66, 150
Atl. 98, 99 (1930) ; Chappell's Estate, supra note 241; Young's Estate, 99 Pa. 74, 83
(1881) ; George's Appeal, 12 Pa. 260 (1849).
243. Chappell's Estate, supra note 242; see Sloan's Estate, 254 Pa. 346, 350, 98
Atl. 966, 967-68 (1916).
244. Bender's Estate, 278 Pa. 199, 203, 122 Atl. 283, 284 (1923).
245. Stetson's Estate, 305 Pa. 62, 155 Atl. 856 (1931); cf. George's Appeal, 12
Pa. 260 (1849).
246. See, e.g., George's Appeal, supra note 245.
247. Reamer's Estate, 331 Pa. 117, 120-21, 200 Atl. 35 (1938) ; Bullitt's Estate,
308 Pa. 413, 162 Atl. 288 (1932); cf. Kellerman's Estate, 242 Pa. 3, 88 Atl. 865
(1913).
248. Willing's Estate, 288 Pa. 337, 343, 135 Atl. 751, 752 (1927). The act of 1840
does not apply to retrials of questions of fact. Priestly's Appeal, 127 Pa. 420, 17 Atl.
1084 (1889). A failure to claim apportionable items at prior accountings and the
award thereof to corpus can bar the life tenant under the doctrine of res judicata
where such items have become part of the "warp and woof of the corpus. . . "' Jordan
Estate, 83 Pa. D. & C. 1, 14 (Orphans' Ct. 1952) ; see also Bullitt's Estate, supra note
247; Kellerman's Estate, supra note 247.
19571
192 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
statutory limitation, above referred to, will also bar further inquiry
into the earlier accounting.t9
The choice between these three remedies depends somewhat upon
the type of error involved. A review to rectify errors of law can be
obtained most easily by an objection in the next accounting. However,
much can happen in the operation of a trust before another account is
filed, and a petition for review under the Fiduciaries Act of 1949
provides the more efficient remedy before the errors are compounded
and time dulls the edge of husbandry.
I 1. FEDERAL TAX CONSEQUENCES OF APPORTIONMENTS
A. Federal Income Tax Consequences
The 1954 Internal Revenue Code has resolved some but not all
of the basic conflicts between judicial and administrative rules of federal
income taxation of apportioned distributions to income beneficiaries.
The new code follows the prior administrative rule in adopting, in
substantial part, the conduit theory 2 5 under which the beneficiary
249. Brown's Estate, 343 Pa. 19, 29, 21 A.2d 898, 903 (1941); Neafie's Estate,
325 Pa. 561, 564-65, 191 Atl. 56, 58 (1937); see Daub's Estate, 313 Pa. 35, 39-40, 169
AtI. 379, 381 (1933).
250. Grounds for granting review include the following: (1) an error of law
on the face of the record. Stotesbury Estate, 387 Pa. 591, 128 A.2d 587 (1957).
But see Cassatt's Estate, 45 Pa. D. & C. 185 (Orphans' Ct. 1942), where a change in
substantive law was said not to be an error of law apparent on the face of the record.
But cf. Frantz v. Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 220, 3 A.2d 917 (1939); (2) new matter.
Estate of Turnbull, 88 Pa. Super. 482 (1932). But see Priestly's Appeal, 127 Pa. 420,
17 Atl. 1084 (1889), denying review of trustee's commissions later discovered to be
unearned; Mershon Estate, 364 Pa. 549, 73 A.2d 686 (1950), denying review when
knowledge was available to the petitioners and the public at large; ef. Graham's Es-
tate, 28 Pa. Dist. 1023 (1919) ; (3) that the matter was not raised or decided in the
prior adjudication. Reamer's Estate, 331 Pa. 117, 200 Atl. 35 (1938) ; Bullitt's Estate,
308 Pa. 413, 162 Atl. 288 (1932) ; Willing's Estate, 288 Pa. 337, 135 At. 751 (1927) ;
Kellerman's Estate, 242 Pa. 3, 88 Atl. 865 (1913). But see Brown's Estate, 343 Pa.
19, 21 A.2d 898 (1941), refusing review where parties had an opportunity to raise
their objection at prior proceeding; (4) fraud. But see Thorne's Estate, 344 Pa. 503,
25 A.2d 811 (1942), denying review where the party had waited an unreasonable time
to disaffirm a contract made by him while in an alcoholic condition (elaborate dictum) :
Daub's Estate, 313 Pa. 35, 169 Atl. 379 (1933), holding no fraud although the execu-
tor did not disclose the full amount of assets which were distributable; see also Kinter
v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 274 Pa. 436, 118 Atl. 392 (1922) ; Netter Estate, 68 Pa.
D. & C. 309 (Orphans' Ct. 1949), in which laches barred a review: (5) change in the
law. Reamer's Estate; Estate of Mereto, 39 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 679 (Pa. 1929) ; (6)
misconduct of a fiduciary. See Wilford's Estate, 70 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 83 (Pa. 1953),
granting review despite inconvenience and burdensome calculations imposed on trus-
tee. But see Nixon's Estate, 239 Pa. 270, 86 AtI. 849 (1913), impliedly finding no mis-
conduct by a fiduciary who was officer of corporation in which the trust held shares;
Millikan's Appeal, 227 Pa. 502, 76 At]. 248 (1910), refusing review when the party
had neglected earlier to raise objection to excess commissions; Scott's Appeal, 112 Pa.
427, 5 Atl. 671 (1886), denying review when the claimant did not raise the issue
solely because he lived in Ireland.
251. S. Rip. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1954) : "In effect, the concept of
distributable net income gives statutory expression to the principle underlying the tax-
ation of estates and trusts, that is, that these separate taxable entities are only conduits
through which income flows to the beneficiaries. .. "
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generally is taxed only to the extent that the trustee would have been
taxed had no apportionment been made.
The pre-1954 judicial rule had denied the need or desirability of
correlating the incomes of the trustee and the income beneficiaries. 2
While this was perhaps a proper result where the effect was merely to
deny the income beneficiary the benefit of losses and expenses charge-
able to corpus, the doctrine was extended to the point where it enlarged
the created income in the apportionment situation.2" And in so doing
the courts created conflict and confusion as to when and how much
of the apportioned distribution was taxed.
The decisions uniformly created income by adopting the superficial
rule that what an income beneficiary receives for trust accounting
purposes must, without other reason, be income for federal tax purposes.
In Kathryn E. T. Horn2 54 the income beneficiary had received a dis-
tribution of principal in 1940 as reimbursement, under the Pennsyl-
vania apportionment rule of Levy's Estate,255 for loss of income during
earlier years when so-called salvage expenses exceeded rental income.
The principal distribution was taxed as income at the beneficiary level
although there was in fact no income at the trustee level. This type
of arbitrary creation of taxable income runs the gamut of most ap-
portionment situations. In Plunkett v. Commissioner " the beneficiary
was taxed on a surcharge receipt apportioned under Massachusetts law
as replacement of hypothetical income which "might have been" had
there been no breach of trust by the surcharged trustee. In Johnston
v. Helvering,"5 tax was imposed upon an apportionment under New
York law of a part of the sales proceeds of foreclosed property although
the trustee had incurred a. loss; and a similar apportionment under
Pennsylvania law was similarly taxed in John F. Nixon. s
This judicial approach defined taxable income not by its character
but by the character or status of the recipient. In the Johnston decision
the court stated the rule as follows:
252. In denying the income beneficiary's right to deduct a loss realized by the trust,
a conceptualistic approach was established in Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20 (1933) :
"In so ruling, we do not forget that the trust is an abstraction, and that the economic
pinch is felt by men of flesh and blood. Even so, the law has seen fit to deal with this
abstraction for income tax purposes as a separate existence, making its own return
under the hand of the fiduciary and claiming and receiving its own appropriate de-
ductions." Id. at 27.
253. KENNEDY, FIED5RAL INCOME TAxATION op TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 2.15A
(1948).
254. 5 T.C. 597 (1945).
255. 333 Pa. 440, 5 A.2d 98 (1939).
256. 118 F.2d 644 (1st Cir. 1941). But there is substantial basis for treating a sur-
charge receipt as distributable income. Cornelius J. Ryan, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 804
(1949).
257. 141 F.2d 208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 715 (1944).
258. 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 741 (1945).
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. . [T]he amount of the proceeds apportioned to petitioners
under this rule must, as far as petitioners, the life income bene-
ficiaries, are concerned, be considered as 'income' received by them,
since under the instrument creating the trusts petitioners were
only entitled to receive 'income' and nothing else." (Emphasis
added.) -"
But if the trust instrument stipulates that principal be invaded for
distribution to the beneficiary, it is conceded that the distribution could
not be taxed as income; and this should be the result even though the
instrument stipulates that a prospective principal distribution shall
depend upon an apportionable event. Why, then, should a different
result obtain simply because the instrument is silent and, in its stead,
the local law speaks and requires the apportionment of a principal sum?
Nevertheless, the judicial rule persisted and, having thus created
taxable income in cases involving cash distributions, the extreme
extension of the doctrine, however erroneous, was eventually exemplified
in McCullough v. Commissioner.26 In that case the court held the
life tenant taxable upon an apportioned stock dividend which had been
received tax-free by the trustee. By special ruling, 6' the Treasury
Department refused to follow the McCullough decision and thereby
continued its prior administrative rule 62 that "income of a trust,
which is currently distributable, retains in the hands of the beneficiary
the identity which it possesses in the hands of the trustee." This
administrative rule was curiously and inconsistently used as precedent
in that the beneficiary was not taxed when the trustee sold the tax-free
stock dividend and distributed cash in lieu of stock," but tax was
imposed upon cash distributions resulting from apportionments due
to surcharge and salvage receipts of the kind dealt with in the Johnston
case.
259. Robert W. Johnston, 1 T.C. 228, 237 (1942); followed in John F. Nixon,
supra note 258, at 742. But where the income beneficiary did not claim the apportion-
ment, and there was some doubt under local Pennsylvania law that an apportionment
would have been granted if claimed, the beneficiary was not taxed on his hypothetical
right to the apportionment. Marjorie V. L. Hudson, 8 T.C. 950 (1947).
260. 153 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1946). The decision benefited the taxpayer who had been
apportioned and had later sold stock dividend stock, and who then claimed a high cost
equal to its fair market value at the dividend distribution date. The result was contrary
to I.T. 1622, 1I-1 Cum. BuLL. 135 (1923) which ruled that the beneficiary was not tax-
able on a stock dividend which was tax-free in the hands of the trustee.
261. P-H 1948 FED. TAx SvRv. II 76225.
262. I.T. 1622, I-1 Cum. BULL. 135 (1923) ; G.C.M. 21532, 1939-2 Cum. BuL.
231.
263. Rev. Rul. 24, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 263, imposed tax only on the gain, if any,
from the sale of the stock. If the stock was not sold but distributed in kind to the
beneficiary, he also received the benefit of the cost basis of the stock apportioned to
him. Special Ruling, I.T. 1622, II-1 Cum. BULL. 135 (1923). Special Ruling, 5 CCH
1952 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ff 6157.
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It is apparent that the administrative rule rendered only lip service
to its expressed philosophy that income "retains in the hands of the
beneficiary the identity which it possesses in the hands of the trustee."
If this language meant what it said, salvage sales proceeds of the
Johnston type surely- would have had the "identity" of non-taxable
principal in the hands of the trustee; nevertheless, apportioned proceeds
of this type were treated as ordinary income in the hands of the bene-
ficiary."' However, if the apportionment was directly traceable to a
transaction which itself produced not only the apportionable event but
also capital gain, the beneficiary would be taxed on the apportionable
distribution as capital gain, at least in part.2
_A further perplexing problem under the pre-1954 law was that
of determining when the beneficiary was taxable in the case where he
received the distribution in a year subsequent to the apportionable
event. The answer depended upon whether the apportionment decree
spoke as of the date of the apportionable event so that the apportionment
could be said to be an income item which was currently distributable
by the trustee. In Kathryn E. T. Horn26  the tax court held that the
beneficiary was taxable in the later year of distribution because the
issue lay within the discretion of the court, which was not exercised
until its decree was handed down.2 67 This conclusion was contrary
to the prior holding in Johnston v. Helvering 6 and to subsequent
decisions by the district court, tax court and the circuit court.2 69 The
conflicting tax court rule appears to have been laid at rest in the light
of the principle that, in determining what is currently distributable,
264. Carrie A. Kolb, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1184 (1947), involved the usual ap-
portionment situation in which salvage sales produced a loss. The court concluded that
"Since no capital gain was realized by either the trust or the life beneficiary, nothing
can be taxed as capital gain." Id. at 1186. If capital gain was realized to some extent,
who would receive the resulting tax benefit: beneficiary, trustee, or both in allocable
shares?
265. Rev. Rul. 24, 1953-1 Cum&. BuLL. 263. Cf. Commissioner v. Hopkinson, 126
F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Arthur Letts, Jr., 30 B.T.A. 800 (1934), aff'd, 84 F.2d 760
(9th Cir. 1936); McNaghten v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 509 (Ct. Cl. 1937). But
if trustee and beneficiary are apportioned equal portions of $1,000 of sales proceeds
that produced $600 capital gain, who pays the tax on the $600 gain: (a) trustee on
$600; (b) trustee on $500 and beneficiary on $100; c) trustee on $100 and bene-
ficiary on $500 gain? Alternative (c) would apply if the presumption be that gain is
first distributed.
266. 5 T.C. 597 (1945).
267. See also Emily B. Harrison, 7 T.C. 1 (1946); A. Douglas Russel, 7 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 627 (1948); Mary deF. H. Geary, 9 T.C. 8 (1947). Marjorie V. L.
Hudson, 8 T.C. 950 (1947), reaches the same result but emphasizes the unsettled condi-
tion of the Pennsylvania apportionment law as inconsistent with the concept of cur-
rently distributable income.
268. 141 F.2d 208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 715 (1944) ; note holding of tax
court in Johnston v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 228, 240 (1942).
269. Cope v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1948) ; Thomas B. Wana-
maker, Jr., 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 203 (1955); Polt (Estate of Robert L. Dula) v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C. 646 (1955), aff'd, 233 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1956).
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"tax consequences to the beneficiaries cannot be determined by the
timing of payment over by the trustee, even though he may be guided
by an honest, if doubtful, interpretation of the state law." 270
1. The Conduit Concept of the 1954 Code
The 1954 code now establishes the conduit rule with the result
that the beneficiary is taxed on no greater amount of income than
was received by the trustee. This is accomplished principally by the
new concept of "distributable net income," defined as the taxable income
at the trustee level which (subject to certain statutory adjustments)
operates as the maximum amount taxable to the beneficiary.2 71 The
Report of the Senate Finance Committee leaves no doubt but that
apportionments currently distributable to the beneficiaries are taxed
only if and to the extent that they are taxable to the trustee, regardless
of whether the source of the apportionment be a stock dividend as in
the McCullough case, the proceeds of salvage sales as in the Johnston
case, or any other apportionable event.
2 72
"Distributable net income" is computed by excluding from taxable
income, insofar as concerns apportionment distributions, (1) those
capital gains which are "allocated to corpus and . . not paid,
credited or required to be distributed to any beneficiary during the
taxable year," and (2) those extraordinary dividends or taxable stock
dividends which the fiduciary, acting in good faith, does not pay or
credit to any beneficiary by reason of his determination that such divi-
dends are allocable to corpus under the terms of the governing instru-
ment and applicable local law.2" Since the starting point is "taxable
270. Polt v. Commissioner, supra note 269, at 896.
271. INT. IZv. Conz op 1954, §§ 643, 652, 662; S. RiP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 82 (1954).
272. S. Rzr. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 346 (1954) states that the new § 652
.provides that the beneficiaries of a trust which is required to distribute all of its
income currently are taxed on the amounts of income required to be distributed to
them, whether distributed or not; however, if such amount exceeds the distributable
net income of the trust, each beneficiary is taxed only on his proportionate share of the
distributable net income .... The effect of this limitation . . . insures that the bene-
ficiary will not be taxed on certain distributions to him that represent income under
the local law applicable to trusts but that are not regarded as income to the trust for
Federal income tax purposes. Under certain decisions of existing law, a beneficiary has
been held taxable on his distributable share of proceeds received by a trust from a de-
faulted mortgage even though the total proceeds were less than the principal of the
mortgage debt, and the trust thus realized no gross income .... Similarly, the receipt
by a beneficiary of a stock dividend that was not taxable in the hands of the trust was
determined to be a taxable distribution in McCullough v. Commissioner .... Although
similar results may or may not be reached in other cases, the limitation of this section
should insure that such a construction will not arise in cases where the new provisions
of this part are applicable and will preserve the conduit principle in this area."
273. INT. Riv. Com or 1954, § 643. This provision rounds out the conduit principle
by passing through the tax-free income items as well. Subsections (5), (6) and (7)
respectively provide for inclusion in distributable net income of tax-free interest, for-
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income," there is automatically excluded from "distributable net in-
come" not only the capital gain and extraordinary dividend items
already mentioned but also items of receipt which fall outside the
"taxable income" area because, under general taxation principles, they
are tax-freeY 4  Examples are the receipt of principal payments or of
non-taxable stock dividends.
The relationship between trustee and beneficiary is further refined
by subpart B in the case of "Simple Trusts," and by subpart C in the
case of "Complex Trusts," 275 which require the trustee to deduct and
the beneficiary to pay tax upon the amount of trust accounting income
required to be distributed currently; but the amount so taxable to
the beneficiary cannot exceed the amount of "distributable net income."
Thus, an apportionment will be taxed to the beneficiary only if in the
first instance it is a taxable item in the trustee's hands, and if so taxable,
it must be a sum which is "required to be distributed currently."
Assuming that the apportioned item is taxable in the trustee's
hands, and that it is taxable currently to the trustee because it need not
be, and in fact is not, distributed to the beneficiary, a subsequent dis-
tribution of the item may be taxed to the beneficiary under the new
"throw-back" rule which would entitle the beneficiary to take credit for
any tax previously paid by the trustee2 7T However, even the delayed
taxation of the beneficiary under the throw-back rule is limited to
income which was initially taxable as such in the hands of the trustee. 77
Finally, the conduit concept is rounded out by the rule that the
amount of distributable net income taxable to the beneficiaries shall
have the same character in the hands of the beneficiary as in the hands
of the trust. 7 8  While this statement of the rules of taxation of
fiduciary income is undoubtedly oversimplified, it is sufficient as
background against which to test the income tax consequences of
apportionment distributions.
eign source income of a foreign trust, and dividends otherwise excludible under section
116. These items are thus included, passed through and then excluded at the beneficiary
level under rules of limitation pertaining to pro-rating tax-exempt income, deductibility
of expenses, etc.
274. The approach adopted by the bill eliminates the necessity, in determining the
taxability of distributions, of tracing such distributions to the income of the estate or
trust for the current taxable year. S. !nP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1954).
275. INT. Rrv. CoDe or 1954, §§ 651, 652 (Subpart B) applies only to trusts which
are required to distribute all income currently to non-charitable beneficiaries. INT. Pv.
CoDe or 1954, §§ 661, 662, 663 (Subpart C), applies to trusts and estates which, in addi-
tion to the first tier of income "required to be distributed currently," have other income,
which is paid, credited or required to be distributed.
276. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 665-68.
277. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 668(a), provides that the delayed distribution is
taxable to the beneficiary only "to the extent that such total would have been included
in the income of such beneficiary ... if [it] ...had been paid to such beneficiary
... in the preceding taxable year."
278. INT. Rv. CoDs or 1954, §§ 652 (b), 661 (b).
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As already indicated, all non-taxable receipts of the trustee are, by
definition, excludible from distributable income. Since the beneficiary
cannot be taxed upon any amount greater than the distributable net
income, it follows that apportionment distributions of non-taxable
stock dividends, and of salvage sale proceeds which are not productive
of gain, are non-taxable in the hands of the beneficiary.
2
1
9
But many apportionments are from a source productive of capital
gain, as where they arise from the sale of stock of a corporation with
accumulated earnings during the trust period, or from the sale of a
non-taxable stock dividend. The question will then arise: if but part
of the proceeds are apportioned and distributed to the beneficiary, is he
taxable on only a pro rata share of the gain or is he taxable on all
of the gain to the extent of the distribution received by him? .8 The
commissioner's regulations suggest that the beneficiary is taxable on the
whole gain only if that gain is "utilized (pursuant to the terms of the
governing instrument or the practice followed by the fiduciary) in
determining the amount which is distributed or required to be dis-
tributed." This rule is apparently applicable where the full gain is
included in the apportioned distribution because the trust instrument
expressly so provides, or in a unique traceable situation such as under
New Jersey law where a stock dividend is apportionable in the limited
sense that the trustee is required to sell the stock and distribute the
proceeds represented by capitalized earnings.81 In either case the
gain is utilized and traceable in toto to the apportioned distribution
and, therefore, is fully taxable to the beneficiary."
The more common case is where the sale proceeds are apportioned
between trustee and beneficiary and neither the trust instrument nor
the factual situation indicates how the related gain is to be apportioned.
In such case, and assuming the apportionment is "distributable" or
is in fact distributed in the year the gain is realized, there are several
possibilities. The lone Pennsylvania decision, Francis R. Dravo
Trust,28 holds that the amount apportionable to the income beneficiary
must be regarded as a distribution of capital gain up to but not exceed-
279. See note 272 supra.
280. Note, 12 TAx L. Riv. 99, 102 (1956), suggests that the beneficiary is taxable
on capital gains "only in the relatively rare cases where the governing instrument spe-
cifically requires distribution of the proceeds or the facts clearly reveal an intent to
make available to the beneficiary the proceeds of a sale or exchange as such."
281. The life tenant is said to have merely a charge on the stock dividend insofar
as earnings were capitalized. McCracken v. Gulick, 92 N.J. Eq. 214, 112 Atl. 317
(Ch. 1920) ; Hagedorn v. Arens, 106 N.J. Eq. 377, 150 Atl. 4 (Ch. 1930).
282. Other situations in which the whole gain is taxed to the beneficiary are where
it is regular practice to distribute the net proceeds of sale, or if the gain is allocated to
corpus which itself is distributed in the year of realization of the gain. U.S. Treas.
Reg. 1.643(a)-3.
283. 99 PiTT. L.J. 397 (1951).
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ing the amount of such gain." A contrary result is indicated by the
regulations which, although ambiguous, state that "gains from the
sale or exchange of capital assets are ordinarily excluded from distrib-
utable net income, and are not ordinarily considered as paid, credited,
or required to be distributed to any beneficiary.. ." 25 But apart
from this extreme view which can only be implied from the regulations,
the Internal Revenue Service generally has taken the middle road of
apportioning gain between trustee and beneficiary in the same ratio
that the sales proceeds are apportioned between them. Thus, where a
stock dividend is apportioned and distributed in kind, it has been ruled
that the beneficiary also receives the allocated cost basis attached to
the stock with the result that upon a later sale only the excess of
proceeds over basis (i.e., the apportioned gain) will be taxable to him.2 6
Moreover, if the trustee first sells the stock dividend and then apportions
the proceeds, the beneficiary will be regarded as receiving a portion
equal to the allocated cost basis as a tax-free distribution of principal.28 7
While at first sight this middle road appears to offer the more
equitable rule, the more logical rule is that of the Dravo Trust which,
to the extent possible, apportions the entire gain to the beneficiary.
It is only this rule which is consistent with the dual concepts that the
beneficiary receives only the equivalent of retained corporate earnings,
and that intact value must be preserved in all events. Consider the
case of stock purchased at, and having an intact value of, $1,000;
accumulated earnings are $200; the stock is sold for $1,200. The
beneficiary will be apportioned $200 and the trustee will retain $1,000
as intact value; but any tax on the gain, apportioned to the trustee, will
invade and reduce intact value. In this situation, to preserve intact
value it is necessary that the beneficiary be presumed to have received
(and be taxable upon) the entire gain.
The date of distribution to the income beneficiary usually occurs in
a year subsequent to the apportionable event. This deferment may
be due to the careful fiduciary practice of withholding any unusual
distribution until it has been included in an account and schedule of
distribution which has been judicially approved; or perhaps the dis-
tribution was deferred pending the outcome of conflicting claims of
life tenant and remaindermen. If the apportionment (including its
284. This rule is comparable to the statutory presumption that dividends are paid
out of the most recent profits. See note, 12 TAx L. REv. 99, 101 (1956). Cf. Irish V.
Commissioner, 129 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1942). This result is consistent with the concept
of apportionment which entitles the income beneficiary to accumulated earnings; hence,
the gain should be fully taxed to him if his distribution is in lieu of earnings.
285. U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.643(a)-3.
286. G.C.M. 21532, 1939-2 Cum. BuLL. 231.
287. Rev. Rul. 24, 1953-1 Cum. Buu.. 263.
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taxable portion) is an item which "is required to be distributed cur-
rently," it is taxable to the income beneficiary as a part of the "distribut-
able net income" in the year of realization by the trustee;'but if the
apportionment is regarded as a non-distributable item, the trustee is
taxable in the year of realization since he will have allocated the
income item to corpus.2 8
It may be significant that section 643 (a) (4), applicable solely to
"extraordinary dividends and taxable stock dividends," permits the
trustee "acting in good faith" to allocate such income items to corpus,
which thereby results in taxation of the trustee rather than the bene-
ficiary. But the "good faith" words are absent in the preceding
subsection (3) which deals with capital gains and which reduces the
"distributable net income" by capital gains only "to the extent that
such gains are allocated to corpus." It can be argued that in the
capital gain situation the trustee has no discretion (not even that which
he might exercise in "good faith"); that irrespective of his "good
faith" in allocating the capital gain item to principal, the tax result
depends upon the final determination under state law, and if it is decided
in a later year that the item "is required to be distributed currently,"
it will be taxed to the beneficiary in the earlier year of receipt by the
trustee.
The weight of pre-1954 code law is to the effect that "currently
distributable" income includes the capital gain component of an appor-
tionment even though the beneficiary's claim was contested and finally
upheld only in a year subsequent to the year of receipt by the trustee." 9
This "currently distributable" concept found in section 162(b) of the
1939 code required only that the beneficiary have a recognized present
right, under the instrument or local law, which is legally enforceable
apart from judicial discretion or judicial review of the trustee's reason-
able discretion. 90 It has been generally assumed that this pre-1954
definition applies with equal force to the 1954 code phrase "required
to be distributed currently." But there is some reason to question
this assumption.
Consider these three factors in conjunction with each other:
First, the statute states that the trust income must be "required to be
288. INT. Rzv. CODX or 1954, §§ 651(a), 652(a), 661(a), 662(a). If the income
item is allocated to corpus, it follows that it is excluded from "distributable net in-
come." INT. R.v. CODS OF 1954, §§ 643(a) (3), (4). Its later distribution to the bene-
ficiary will not be taxed to him under the "throw-back rule," INr. Rpv. CoDS or 1954,
§§ 665-68, because it is only trustees' accumulations of "distributable net income"
which come within that rule. S. R.F'. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 358 (1954).
289. See note 265 supra.
290. INNDY, FEDERAL INcOMS TAXATION or TRUSTS AND EsTATSs § 2.05G
(1948).
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distributed currently," thereby suggesting that the result depends on a
duty which is "required" of the trustee. Second, the emphasis upon
the trustee's affirmative and personal duty is confirmed by the Senate
Finance Committee Report which states that, "The fiduciary must be
under a duty to distribute the income currently even if, as a matter of
practical necessity, the income is not distributed until after the close
of the trustee's taxable year." 291 Third, in regard to the specific item
of capital gain, the foregoing report indicates that it is intended "to tax
capital gains to the estate or trust where the gains must be or are added
to principal," 292 i.e., although not mandatory in the "must" sense, it
was contemplated that gains might be diverted from the income bene-
ficiary to corpus in the trustee's discretion. In the case of apportion-
ments under Pennsylvania law it is considered the duty of the trustee
to act as a stakeholder "3 and withhold any distribution until the claim-
ant has carried the burden of proof to require it. If it be his duty
to withhold in the first instance, it follows that the trustee can hardly
be under a duty to distribute; and lacking such a duty, the apportion-
ment item could not be one which is "required to be distributed cur-
rently." It is suggested that this is the correct result from the adminis-
trative standpoint as well, for it eliminates the senseless problem of
determining who is taxable during a period of litigation (often con-
cluded many years after the taxable event) when there are several
possible claimants including those not yet born.2 4
B. Federal Estate and Gift Tax Consequences
The right to an apportionment distribution has been held to be
a property right which is includible in the taxable estate of a deceased
life tenant although, whether through inadvertence or intention,295 he
has not claimed that to which he was entitled.29 While as a general
rule the existence of such a property right is determined by local law,
29 7
291. S. Rxs. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1954).
292. Id. 343.
293. King Estate, 355 Pa. 64, 78, 48 A.2d 858, 866 (1946) ; Buist's Estate, 297 Pa.
537, 542, 147 Atl. 606, 608 (1929) ; Thompson's Estate, 262 Pa. 278, 281, 105 Ati. 273,
274 (1918).
294. Moore & Sorlien, Homeless Income, 8 TAx L. Rxv. 425, 440-43 (1953). The
"requirement" for distribution surely has not arrived if the trustee is duty bound to
withhold apportionment until the beneficiaries have ascertained and established (1) the
identity of the beneficiaries entitled and (2) the facts necessary to determine the amount
of the apportionment.
295. The income beneficiary frequently will prefer that a claimable apportionment
remain a part of principal in the hope that it may thereby pass to his children, as re-
maindermen, without reduction by federal estate tax.
296. Soles v. Granger, 174 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1949).
297. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) ; Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35
(1933).
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the federal court will itself determine that question in the absence of a
state court decree,"' 8 and it may disregard an ex parte decree or award
which conflicts with the local law.2 99
The most effective and perhaps the only sure method of avoiding
this estate tax result is an assignment of the life tenant's entire interest
in the trust estate. The more limited assignment or release to the
trustee of only the apportionment right, while retaining the income right,
is in effect the creation of a trust in which the beneficiary, in this limited
sense acting as a grantor, has reserved an interest in the income300
However, it is possible that relief may also be found in the rule,
more commonly applied in the case of a power of appointment, that a
disclaimer or renunciation of an otherwise taxable power "within a
reasonable time after learning of its existence" will eliminate it from
estate and gift taxation.30 1 Both the estate and the gift tax regula-
tions recognize that one need not accept a property interest, and that
affirmative non-acceptance will insulate the reluctant donee from tax
consequences which otherwise would follow from ownership of an
apportionment right. While the pertinent rules are set forth only in
those parts of the regulations dealing with powers of appointment, that
area itself is sufficiently broad to include the power or right to invade
principal or to demand a distribution which, if not made, would become
a part of principal. °2
Thus, the right of the life tenant to demand an apportionment
from principal is the substantial equivalent of a power which in a real
298. Estate of George M. Henderson, 45 B.T.A. 1080 (1941); Estate of Amy
H. DuPuy, 9 T.C. 276 (1947).
299. Sharpe v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1939). In holding that the
trust interest was taxable in the parent's estate, even though such interest passed direct-
ly to children in default of a claim made by the parent's executors, the court noted that
"the practice of short-cutting through to the final beneficiary is not uncommon." To
the same effect, see Earle v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1946).
300. Hence the interest so released continues to be includible in the taxable estate
of the beneficiary. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 2036. In Commissioner v. Henry's
Estate, 161 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1947), the parties and both sides of the divided court
agreed that if the apportionment right had been released after March 3, 1931 (the
effective date of the predecessor provision to § 2036), estate tax would have resulted.
Cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 20.2041-3(d) (3), holding that the lapse of an annual with-
drawal right is treated as a transfer, subject to a reserved interest, which is includible
in the estate of the holder of the power.
301. A disclaimer or renunciation, as distinguished from a release or assignment,
of a general power will effectively divorce the donee from the appointive property so
that he will not be subject to gift or estate tax in respect of such property. But if such
disclaimer is to be effective under local law, it must occur prior to acceptance and
within a reasonable time from the date the donee learned of the existence of the power,
and the power must be disclaimed fully and not merely in part. U.S. Treas. Reg.
20.2041-3(d) (6), 25.2514-3(c) (5); Edith Evelyn Clark, 47 B.T.A. 865 (1942), per-
mitted a tax-free "relinquishment" of a power over principal after it had existed
for over a year.
302. "The term 'power of appointment' includes all powers which are in substance
and effect powers of appointment regardless of the nomenclature used in creating the
power and regardless of local property law connotations." U. S. Treas. Regs. 20.2041-1
(b) (1), 25.2514-1(b) (1).
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sense is separate and distinct from the right to income; and being a
separate and distinct power, the life tenant may be able to renounce and
disclaim the apportionable amount without tax consequences. The
importance of the words "separate and distinct" follows from the
definitive statement in the estate tax regulations: 303
"A disclaimer is a complete and unqualified refusal to accept the
rights to which one is entitled. Such rights refer to the incidents
of the power and not to other interests of the decedent (or, as used
in the Gift Tax Regulations, the possessor of the power) in the
property." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, if the apportionment right which accrues only occasionally is
regarded as a separate power, distinct from the recurring income right,
it might be "completely" disclaimed in order to avoid both estate and
gift taxes.
But it is arguable that, while the apportionment right is indeed
"separate and distinct" in many ways, it could exist only in conjunction
with the recurring right to income. In other words, the chief justifica-
tion for an apportionment is that it replaces a prior loss or reduction
of the recurring income rights. In this sense, the apportionment right
and the income right have the same source and are so integrated that
both may be required to be disclaimed in order to meet the requirement
of the regulations that there be "a complete and unqualified refusal to
accept the rights to which one is entitled."
Nevertheless, it is significant that non-taxable apportionment dis-
tributions are generally regarded for federal income tax purposes as
separate from those recurring income items which are includible in
"distributable net income." It is also significant that under local law
many apportionment distributions are made out of principal, in the
trust accounting sense. In fact, the apportionment right itself repre-
sents an exception to the general rules governing trust income and, in
its status as an "exception," the apportionment can be rationally
treated as a separate right or power which alone may be disclaimed
without tax consequences. This was essentially the conclusion reached
in Commissioner v. Henry's Estate 30 4 in which the life tenant had,
pursuant to a prior family settlement agreement, executed contemporary
approvals and waivers which permitted apportionable stock dividends
to be retained by the trustee. In holding that such stock dividends were
not a part of the deceased life tenant's taxable estate, the court in effect
acknowledged the right of disclaimer of the apportionable interest.
303. See note 301 supra.
304. 161 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1947).
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In the absence of an effective disclaimer or renouncement, existing
and future apportionable interests may be disposed of by a blanket re-
lease or assignment which constitutes a taxable gift " (unless adequate
consideration is received). But if there be such a prior transfer of
apportionment rights in futuro, does the gift occur when the appor-
tionable event occurs, or when the trust account is audited and approved
by judicial decree? 30' Ordinarily, the gift occurs at the latter date
since until then the release of the apportionment right remains "inchoate
and imperfect"; not until then has there been a "change of legal rights
and . . . shifting of economic benefits." 307
In regard to both federal estate and gift taxes, therefore, the
person entitled to an apportionment right has a very narrow area of
action to avoid tax consequences. He can only disclaim or renounce
the right; and in doing so, he must act promptly. Moreover, if he
retains the recurring income interest, he runs the risk that his disclaimer
is ineffective because it is not a "complete and unqualified refusal to
accept the rights to which one is entitled."
One would assume that the state inheritance tax rule would be
the same as the federal estate tax rule and, if the apportionment right is
properly claimable by the life tenant or his executor, it is difficult to
support anything but a taxable result. But at least one Pennsylvania
decision avoids the tax in the limited situation where a stock dividend
is declared after the life tenant's death. While the life tenant's estate
was entitled to an apportioned share of the stock dividend (as represent-
ing income accumulated during the trust term while the life tenant
lived), nevertheless, it was concluded in Belmont Estate"s that such
stock could not be "inherited" from the life tenant because it was
issued after her death. In other words, at date of death the stock
was non-existent and thus could not constitute property of which the
life tenant was then "seized or possessed." While at first glance this
decision seems to ignore the taxability of the "claim" as a property
item separate from its subject matter, nevertheless it has the merit of
laying at rest the potential inheritance tax liability which otherwise
would hover over the trusteed stock of any corporation which has
accumulated earnings during the trust term.
305. Cf. Cerf v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 564 3d Cir. (1944) ; Edith Evelyn Clark,
47 B.T.A. 865, 867 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
306. Perhaps even the decree date is not sufficiently definitive inasmuch as within
five years thereof the income beneficiary may petition to open the decree.
307. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933); Commissioner v. Allen, 108
F-2d 961 (3d Cir. 1939).
308. P-H INH. & TRAxs. TAx SERv. Ir 1017 (Orphans' Ct Montg. Co., Pa.
1954).
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IV. OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
A. Historical Changes
Until recently Pennsylvania apportionment decisions have given
the impression of protecting life tenants as the proximate objects of
the testator's bounty. Many of the cases arose during depression years
when there was an understandable desire to allocate income to the
hard pressed life tenant. Perhaps it is the improved economic status
of the community that has reversed the trend in favor of the remainder-
man.
The trend away from the life tenant is more fully expressed by
the adoption of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, and the trend
in other states also seems to be away from the Pennsylvania judicial
rule of apportionmentY 9 This doubtless reflects the effect of increas-
ing complexities, of an accounting as well as of a corporate nature, which
have become a Pandora's box as life tenants have probed more deeply
into the opportunities for apportionment. Fiduciaries are not in agree-
ment as to the simplest kind of calculations, much less the more compli-
cated ones.
Although the Pennsylvania rule was founded as an equitable
doctrine, it often tends to be illogical, inconsistent and sometimes un-
fair. 1" Inflation has caused changes in corporate profits, dividends
and security values which are so extreme as to justify a searching
inquiry as to the equitable effect of the apportionment rules. In a sense,
the application of the rules is founded in capriciousness due to the fact
that, in the case of an apportionment based on sale, it is contingent upon
an act of the trustee and not upon any coordinated managerial decision.
The fiduciary's decision as to the sale of one stock and the retention
of another, is often arbitrary and perhaps influenced by the desire to
make an apportionment or the fear of making one. Sales may be
made or withheld for other than investment reasons and beneficiaries
may bring pressure for sales at profits when investment reasons would
dictate otherwise. Moreover, the rule fails to consider that corporate
management may have reinvested earnings for the benefit of the life
tenant in order to provide a consistently higher income.
There is a serious question as to whether corporate earned surplus
should have the sacred meaning ascribed to it by the great mass of
apportionment decisions. Instead, there should be room for the concept
that accumulated surplus is less an income retention than it is a vehicle
309. See note 267 supra.
310. See expert testimony in Ketterlinus Estate, Civil No. 2223, Orphans' Ct.,
Phila. Co., 1952.
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to replace capital equipment at constantly increasing costs, thereby
assuring future income which otherwise might be lost to the life
tenant.3 1 '
B. Accounting Problems
Book values, as used to compute intact value and as an aid in
computing retained earnings, should be stated to the date nearest the
intact value and apportionable event dates. Generally, interim state-
ments will be adequate, but the claimant to the apportionment can,
and sometimes should, insist upon a reasonable per diem adjustment.
Occasionally the earned surplus has been reduced by an arbitrary
reserve such as one labeled for inventory depreciation or, more gener-
ally, for contingencies of an unexplained character. These reserves
should be eliminated if, and to the extent that, they are unreasonable as
to the contingency or the amount retained. Although the trustee should
be able to rely upon the stated corporate book value, where these values
are not realistic a guide in this area may be found in the accounting
procedure required by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Earnings should include contingency reserves which are clearly segre-
gations of earned surplus and not genuine reserves set aside against
probable losses or decreases in values. Depreciation reserves are
proper; but where the company revalues annually there seems to be
no reason why book value, disregarding these reserves for revaluation,
cannot be considered intact value. In any event, any interested party
has the right to delve into the corporate accounting procedures which
were used.
In the case of apportioning proceeds of a sale or similar disposition
of shares in the same corporation, purchased at different times by the
trustee, it seems advisable that intact value should be the weighted
average purchase price. 12 To do otherwise would make the appor-
tionment result contingent on which shares the trustee may wish to
sell where only a portion of the holdings are to be sold. In the case of
an apportionment resulting from a corporate distribution, however, a
share-for-share approach is entirely appropriate.
Intact value in the case of a revocable inter vivos trust should be
based on book value as of the date of the settlor's death, for the settlor
311. Indeed, the lower court in Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434, 438 (1882), stated
that "Everything which is necessary to carry into effect the purposes of the company
is capital. Even when profits assume this character they become capital, and cannot
be treated as profits, nor can they cease to be capital." But see Nirdlinger's Estate, 290
Pa. 457, 470, 139 At. 200, 205 (1927).
312. But see King Estate, 355 Pa. 64, 48 AtI. 858 (1946).. "Each individual share
of stock possesses an intact value." Id. at 69, 48 At. at 861.
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retains control over the property until his death and can withdraw or
substitute at will.
Where the trust benefits successive life tenants, the original intact
value continues and is not adjusted by reason of a different book value
at the death of the first life tenant; if this were not so, the apportionment
rights which vest in the deceased and succeeding life tenants would be
improperly limited. Life tenants are, of course, limited to the accruals
of earnings during their respective tenancies, but they should not be
required to sustain an intact value in excess of that at the time the
trust became irrevocable.
Usually the trustee will have purchased shares at market value, but
if a trustee had the opportunity to buy shares at less than market, 13 the
amount expended for the purchase, and not the actual or the book value,
would probably control intact value. However, in the case of trustee-
purchased shares having an intact value equal to market value, a rea-
sonable case can be presented for limiting an apportionable distribution
to an extent which assures the corpus having a fair market value at the
apportionment date of not less than such intact value. Often book
value has limited analytical meaning, particularly where there is a sharp
disparity between it and market value." 4 The important factors to be
compared should be the cost or charge values of marketable securities
and their ultimate value in a distribution or sale.
Despite the fact that accounting problems in computing an appor-
tionment-may be extremely complex in even the simplest case, it would
be well for the accountant to detect and adjust for intangible values,
valuation write-ups, allowances for gain or loss on the sale of capital
assets, and the like. There is a double check in this situation due to the
fact that the calculation of retained earnings on one hand may be com-
pared with increase in the book value; and if the increase in book value
and retained earnings calculated from the profit and loss statement ap-
pear to be similar, then intermediate surplus adjustments would gener-
ally have little if any significance. On the other hand, if these quan-
turns are dissimilar, the corporate accounting must be re-examined
minutely in order to limit the apportionment distribution to a proper
amount.
It seems unfortunate that there is no present practice supporting
an equitable adjustment to intact value where apportioned stock divi-
dends have "captured" a part of the tax cost basis so that, on a later
313. As where the estate of a deceased employee exercises an option to acquire
stock of the employer corporation pursuant to the present regulations. See INT. REV.
COD or 1954, § 421.
314. For example, on December 31, 1956, the book value of Pennsylvania Rail-
road shares was $107, while the market value was only $22.
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sale, the corpus may be depleted by additional federal tax on capital
gains. Although usually it is not wise to consider federal tax conse-
quences as a criterion of apportionment, equitably there should be an
adjustment in this situation.
C. Trustee Judgment and Mechanical Problems
The Pennsylvania law of apportionment has subjected the trustee
to a multitude of stresses which include not only the extremely difficult
apportionment calulations, but also pressure by various interested par-
ties and the vagaries of an area of law with indefinite boundaries re-
quire the exercise of a combined fiduciary, legal and accounting
judgment.
It is particularly important for the trustee to give appropriate
notice of apportionment opportunities to all interested parties even
though accountings may be infrequent and the resulting apportionment
calculations intermittent. Where the mechanics of trustee reporting
have been set up, such as by quarterly reports, the trustee should indi-
cate the apportionment possibilities even though the presumption may
favor the corpus and the life tenant may have the burden of proof. At
the time of a court accounting, the trustee should indicate in the audit
notice that the accounting includes items which may be apportionable,
although there is a question as to whether the trustee is under a duty
to perform the apportionment mechanics and leave to the interested
parties any adjustments. However, it would not be inappropriate for
the trustee to work out a suggested apportionment upon the filing of the
accounting.Y5
However, as a stakeholder, the trustee is under no affirmative duty
to compute and distribute an apportionable income item, and he should
do so without court approval only when all parties are sui juris, have
acquiesced and have given a release. It is probably true that constant
accountings for the purpose of securing orphans' court approval will
place substantial burdens on that court. If this be the result from an
administrative standpoint, the judicial burden might be somewhat les-
sened by a special committee or knowledgeable masters to resolve the
mechanics of the apportionments and to make the necessary recommen-
315. A conservative trustee would do well to place a notation upon the interim
accounting, stating that certain items in the report may be subject to apportionment,
but that they have been held in principal until the next court account, at which time
they will be apportioned if requested. By so doing, the life beneficiary has been put
on notice. If the trustee does not apportion at the time of the court accounting, there
would then be an indication that the life tenant wished the apportionable amounts to
remain in corpus.
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dations to the court; or else to propound pragmatic rules for special
accountings geared to this problem, 10 without the full burden of a com-
plete accounting.
Although seldom used, Pennsylvania courts have a broad jurisdic-
tion to grant declaratory judgments, including the determination of
questions arising in the administration of estates or trusts and questions
of construction of wills and other writings. 17 Such relief is available
in "civil cases where an actual controversy exists between contending
parties, or where the court is satisfied that antagonistic claims are pres-
ent . . . which indicate imminent and inevitable litigation." 38
However, where "a statute provides a special form of remedy for a
specific type of case, that statutory remedy must be followed." 319 And
a petition for declaratory relief must allege facts sufficient to enable
the court to decide
2 0
The major obstacle to declaratory relief in apportionment cases
is not the requirements of controversy and of specification but the pro-
vision that special statutory remedies must be followed where applicable.
Where apportionment is uncertain, controversy invariably will arise and
there will always be facts within the control of the fiduciary to enable
him to present a sufficiently specific case once the proceeds in question
have been received. The question of the availability of a special statu-
tory remedy, however, is not within the control of the fiduciary and
possibly would be resolved against him, for, although the main purpose
of the limitation appears to be to prevent by-passing of administrative
agencies, it has barred declaratory judgments where relief could have
316. For example, see Orphans' Court Act of 1951, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 80.702
(Purdon Supp. 1956) : "The court may decide or dispose of any question relating to
the administration or distribution of an estate or trust and exercise any of its powers
in respect thereof upon the filing of an account or in-any other appropriate proceed-
ings. The account may be a complete accounting of the estate or trust or of only the
transactions which raise the question to be determined." See also Cassatt's Estate, 105
Pa. Super. 14, 158 Atl. 586 (1932).
317. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 831, 832, 834 (Purdon 1953).
318. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,' § 836 (Purdon 1953).
319. Ibid. This section provides further that "the mere fact that an actual or
threatened controversy is susceptible of relief through a general common-law rem-
edy, or an equitable remedy, or an extraordinary legal remedy, whether such remedy
is recognized or regulated by statute or not, shall not debar a party from the priv-
ilege of obtaining a declaratory judgment or decree in any case where the other essen-
tials to such relief are present."
320. Carwithen's Estate, 327 Pa. 490, 194 Atl. 743 (1937) (relief denied where
trustee asked a determination as to his rights to invest in common stocks but did not
indicate what issues he intended buying) ; Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149,
140 AtI. 862 (1928) (relief denied where trustee asked determination as to apportion-
ment of stock rights but did not allege their disposition) ; Rebmann's Estate, 35 Pa.
D. & C. 33 (Orphans' Ct. 1939) (relief denied where trustee sought a determination
as to retention of common stocks in trust where he did not specify the common stocks
he intended to retain).
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been had from the Register of Wills"' or by an accounting in the
orphans' court."'
But this reasoning need not be extended to apportionment cases.
While a trustee may file a full " or partial 3 4 account at any time, he
cannot do so without substantial effort and perhaps considerable hard-
ship where there is a large and varied portfolio. In such a case, a fidu-
ciary could argue quite plausibly that no satisfactory remedy is avail-
able except the provisions for declaratory relief.3"
Frequently the beneficiary does not desire the distribution of ap-
portionable items and he may so inform the trustee. This suggests that
the trustee might, as a matter of routine administrative policy, discuss
this matter with life tenants and, if appropriate, obtain from them their
written renunciation of future apportionable income items. 26
Some corporate trustees have regarded their duty fulfilled, and
their fiduciary position safe from surcharge, if the apportionable item
is retained in principal until claimed by the life tenant. This not un-
common view reflects the understandable attitude that dollar inflation
has made the intact value calculation meaningless; that it is an anomaly
that the life tenant should share in the gains but not in the losses; that
there is confusion and an inherent risk in interpreting the apportion-
ment rules; and that the tax uncertainties of an apportionment are to
be avoided if at all possible. Nonetheless, these are invalid objections
by a trustee who should deal fairly and impartially and not substitute
his views of equity for those of the law of apportionment.
The authorities are in accord that a trustee is liable for an im-
proper distribution of trust assets, whether of income or principal, made
without court approval; and that this liability exists notwithstanding
a reasonable mistake of fact or law made by the trustee.32 However,
321. Gerety Estate, 349 Pa. 417, 37 A.2d 792 (1944).
322. Folweiler's Estate, 6 Pa. D. & C. 757 (Orphans' Ct. 1924); cf. Dempsey's
Estate, 288 Pa. 458, 137 Atl. 170 (1927), where the court held that it would give a
declaratory judgment on the question of the trustee's duty to account, but not as to
the extent of the required accounting.
323. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.981 (Purdon 1950).
324. See note 316 supra.
325. Cf. Berman Estate, 35 Del. Co. 90 (Pa. 1947) which holds that the avail-
ability of another remedy is not a bar to a declaratory judgment when the case is not
ripe for relief by the other remedy.
326. But the trustee must carefully examine the proposed plan in the light of its
tax consequences.
327. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 227, comment vz(9) (1935). "It [is] the duty of
the trustee, before making any payments whatsoever, to thoroughly and carefully
examine the provisions of the trust instrument .... A fiduciary cannot be relieved
by a mistaken payment made in good faith to the wrong person." Blish Trust, 350
Pa. 311, 317, 38 A.2d 9, 12 (1944). See also Moyer v. Norristown Bank, 296 Pa.
26, 30, 145 Atl. 682, 683 (1929); Heaning v. Riddle, 343 Pa. 453, 23 A.2d 456 (1942)
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to succeed in surcharging the trustee, the complainant must prove that
the trustee failed in his duty of reasonable skill and prudence by failing
to apportion. It will not be enough to show that the trustee did not ap-
portion a stock dividend, for not all such proceeds are apportionable 
3 8
Moreover, even if apportionable, the complainant's acquiescence will
prevent a surcharge, 29 as where the life tenant approved the retention
"for the present" and had received semi-annual notice of the retention
over a period of years through statements of trust income received3
30
If, however, the life tenant had no knowledge of the facts, his acqui-
escence will not protect the trustee from surcharge; " nor will the life
tenant be barred by laches from holding a trustee liable where he had
no reason to know of the breach of trusty02 Thus, where there is no
proof that the life tenants were furnished statements of trust income,
"informing them of these . . . [stock dividends] or of the circum-
stances affecting them, their acceptance of income, without objection
cannot be regarded as acquiescence in the absence of any evidence that
they knew its source, or understood its nature." ' In this respect, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court speaks in terms of a "duty as a fiduciary
to inform the cestuis fully of all matters affecting their interests,"
although in the ordinary case the Restatement of Trusts would impose
no such duty upon a trustee to furnish such information except upon
his request.3 5
D. A Suggested Apportionment Formula
The following is suggested as a simple approach to apportionment
in the normal situation: First, intact value must be determined; next,
determine if intact value has been impaired and, if not, then determine
(cases involving payment to the wrong beneficiary but not involving apportionable
situations). The Heaning opinion states that "Fiduciaries who distribute funds in their
hands without an accounting and an audit of their accounts do so at their own risk,
and when they assume that risk they must be held responsible for payments made
without the approval of the court which turn out to be improper." Id. at 457, 23 A.2d
at 459.
328. Bard's Estate, 339 Pa. 433, 13 A.2d 711 (1940).
329. Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 12 A.2d 71 (1940).
330. Ibid.
331. Bard's Estate, 339 Pa. 433, 13 A.2d 711 (1940) ; R, sTATZNT, TRuSTS § 216
(2) (1935).
332. RESTAT=ENT, TRUSTS §219(1), comment c (1935).
333. Fownes Trust, 3 Pa. D. & C2d 637, 643 (Orphans' Ct. 1959).
334. Klein v. Dunn, 337 Pa. 480, 485, 12 A.2d 56, 58 (1940).
335. Ri=sAizmxNT, TRuSTS § 173, comment d (1935).
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what earnings have been retained and may be paid out; thereafter, de-
termine how much of the retained earnings may be paid out without
impairing intact value; and finally, when stock rather than cash is to be
distributed to the life tenant, determine the number of shares of stock
to be paid out. In these calculations, intact value should be computed
as market value (cost) where the trustee purchased the stock and as
book value where the trustee acquired the stock from a decedent or
settlor.
In determining whether intact value has been impaired, it is im-
portant that the concept of market value (cost) be separate and distinct
from the concept of book value. Comparing the unrelated quantums of
initial market value and terminal book value to determine if intact
value has been impaired, or to delineate the amount apportionable,
appears to be as erroneous as the comparison of cabbages and kings.
When considering the impairment of intact value, market value should
be compared with market value of trustee-purchased stock, and book
value should be compared only with book value of stock acquired by
the trustee from a decedent or settlor. Unfortunately, trust accountants
still adopt widely varying and inconsistent methods.
Having once determined that intact value is not impaired, retained
earnings during the period the stock is held in trust are computed on
the basis of recognized accounting principles and are checked by com-
paring original (at date of death or date of purchase) and terminal
"adjusted" book values.
The result will be a distributable dollar amount which is traceable
to earnings and which does not impair intact value. But if the distribu-
tion is to take the form of shares of stock, there remains the final prob-
lem of equating the predetermined dollar amount with the number of
shares to be distributed, i.e., should those shares be measured in book
value or market value? Current practice leans toward the use of book
value in the case of both trustee-purchased stock and stock acquired from
a decedent or settlor. It is suggested that logic requires the use of
market value in the case of trustee-purchased stork " and book value
in the case of stock acquired from a decedent or settlor. a
7
336. Inasmuch as market value is used to determine intact value and, logically, as
the test for impairment of that intact value, this rule avoids the practical incongruity
of paying out shares at book value which in today's market may have a vastly greater
real value.
337. Inasmuch as book value is used to determine intact value and as the test for
impairment of that intact value, nonetheless it may be plausibly argued that market
value of the distributable stock should be the measure of the number of shares to he
distributed.
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V. CONCLUSION
There is much that courts could still do in clarifying the basic
rules by spelling out a basic apportionment formula; by restating what
constitutes an apportionable event in areas such as corporate reorganiza-
tion distributions where there is still much misunderstanding; by re-
defining intact value and earnings available for apportionment; and,
finally, by more precisely defining the duties and mechanical operations
of the trustee. Since the present apportionment rules are the result of
developments based on statutory as well as judicial determinations, it is
reasonable to suppose that the newer principles of the Uniform Principal
and Income Act should and will affect the older judicial rules of appor-
tionment.
